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DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE
OLIVIER SYLVAIN*
ABSTRACT
Online video streaming applications enable users to watch overthe-air broadcast programs at any time and almost on any device.
As such, they challenge the pertinence of traditional video distribution law and the broadcast network system on which it is based.
Congress enacted the Transmit Clause of the 1976 Copyright Act to
resolve the high-stakes tussle between broadcasters and cable providers. But, today, that provision is ill-suited to resolving whether unauthorized streaming infringes on broadcasters’ copyright to perform
works publicly. Its scope is ambiguous enough that judges across the
country were notably divided on whether it reaches online video distribution—that is, until the Supreme Court ruled that it does in a
divided opinion last term in ABC v. Aereo.
Remarkably, none of the courts to address the question, including
the Supreme Court, consulted the interpretations of video distribution law by the agencies to which Congress delegated the broad authority of doing so pursuant to closely related statutes. The courts
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assumed that they alone should interpret the scope of the Transmit
Clause in the absence of a specific delegation from Congress.
This Article argues that courts instead should consult all of the
public law that Congress set in motion in the area of video distribution law before resolving novel disputes over the scope of the Transmit Clause. This reform would have purchase when, as is the case
today, the Copyright Office and the Federal Communications Commission have authority to interpret online video distribution under
the Copyright Act and the Communications Act, respectively. Although neither agency has the authority to interpret the Transmit
Clause, current administrative law doctrine suggests that those
agencies’ interpretations of closely related statutes are worthy of respect, if not deference. This Article accordingly argues for a more
careful approach to substantive judicial review in this area than the
courts have employed.
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s popular retail internet applications are completely different from the mass market communication technologies that preceded them. Twentieth century broadcasting enabled audiences to
tune in together to live and recorded programs. It dramatically enlarged the size of audiences that could experience live and recorded
programming simultaneously. Broadcast television in this regard was
the great hearth of American culture for most of the twentieth century.1 The major networks were to be the trustees of the public airwaves
that curated every minute of programming for the mass public in order to keep viewers interested.
As transformative as broadcasting was, however, the Internet has
turned the political economy and cultural practices of video distribution inside out. Today, audiences are not so beholden to broadcast
programmers. Current video distribution technologies have unmoored performance from time and place so that each viewer is in far
more control over when and how she watches television programs
than she was before. Viewers can now experience performances at
the time and in the order of their choosing on almost whatever networked device they wish.
After years at the center of the mass communication political
economy, the broadcast incumbents today act as though they have
everything to lose. They have done almost everything in their power
to moderate the disruptive effects of online video distribution.
One of the primary resources to which they have turned to retain
their market position is public law. They have done so in at least
three ways. First, they have lobbied Congress to enact statutes or
amend existing ones to account for new technologies as they emerge.
Congress accordingly has added new exclusive copyrights and
amended the scope of existing ones with specific technologies in
mind. Second, the incumbents have petitioned the pertinent administrative agencies to adopt interpretations of existing law that further
1. See SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, LISTENING IN: RADIO AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION
(2004); J. FRED MACDONALD, ONE NATION UNDER TELEVISION: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NETWORK TV (1993).
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secure their market position. Pursuant to their delegated authority
under the Copyright Act and the Communications Act, respectively,
the Copyright Office and the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) routinely hear such petitions and comments in proceedings
involving novel communications technologies. Third, the incumbents
have challenged the emergent technologies in court, relying on interpretations of existing law that inure to their benefit. It is to this
strategy—appeal to courts—on which I focus in this Article. The majority and dissenting opinions in the United States Supreme Court’s
American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, Inc.2 decision from June 2014
provide an important opportunity to assess how courts might address
technological novelty in the absence of clarity in existing public law.
There, broadcasters argued that an upstart online video distributor
infringed on their copyright to “perform” works “publicly” when it
made broadcasters’ programs available without authorization. The
Court agreed with broadcasters.
Rather than focus on the substantive outcome of the litigation, I
focus here on the interpretive strategies that the courts (the majority
and dissenting opinions in Aereo in particular) have employed to make
sense of the Transmit Clause,3 a provision that Congress wrote well
before any of its members knew anything about networked communications, let alone online video streaming. Judges, I will show, were silent on efforts by the Copyright Office and the FCC to make sense of
online video streaming in proceedings involving related provisions in
the Copyright Act and the Communications Act. They assumed that
courts alone could or should make sense of a statutory provision absent a specific delegation to the agencies to interpret the provision.
The courts’ silence is remarkable at least because judges have
long recognized that they are not always good at making legal sense of
disruptive communication technologies. To be sure, sometimes they
can, should, and do define legal obligations and rights in the first instance, without consulting other institutions. Adjudications concerning the scope of individual constitutional rights like privacy or factdependent considerations like copyright fair use, for example, are the
province of the courts.4 Judges in these cases are not and should not

2. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012).
4. It is worth noting here that, although fair use is explicitly defined in the Copyright
Act, observers have generally recognized it to be a judge-created doctrine that is only really
elaborated in adjudication. I discuss the fair use doctrine below. See infra notes 277–281
and accompanying text.
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be any more reticent to resolve disputes involving disruptive technologies than they are for conventional ones.
In other legislative fields, however, courts are careful not to impose their interpretations of existing statutes without first consulting
institutions created for that very purpose. Scholars generally associate
this reticence with deference.5 Deference has a special meaning in
administrative law doctrine, referring generally to courts’ relative high
regard for agency conclusions.6 For constitutional law and legal process scholars, the concept of deference is a trans-substantive idea that
connotes respect for the formal authority or decisionmaking capacity
of other institutions.7
In both kinds of cases—those where they decide in the first instance without consulting other institutions and those in which they
actively defer to agencies—courts are almost always explicitly mindful
of the limits of their institutional authority and capacity to resolve
disputes involving novel communication technologies. I argue here
that, in the recent online video distribution cases on the scope of the
Transmit Clause, courts should have been far more respectful than
they were of recent and ongoing proceedings at the Copyright Office
and the FCC on how to treat those technologies under sister provisions in the Copyright Act and the Communications Act.
Courts, as it turns out, are not the only ones that jump the gun to
resolve substantive policy disputes involving novel internet applications. Legal commentators, too, have sometimes been far too eager
to determine what the “proper balance” between content owners, innovators, and users ought to be.8 To be sure, some information law
5. See generally LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACT 320
(1965).
6. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
7. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 765–66 (1997); Eric Berger, Individual
Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91
B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032–33 (2011); Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1061, 1072 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional
Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 483 (2010) (referring to the “ordinary” components of administrative law as “statutory and regulatory requirements, such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or Executive Order 12,866 and associated administrative law
doctrines”); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461
(2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885 (2003).
8. See, e.g., Mary Rasenberger & Christine Pepe, Copyright Enforcement and Online File
Hosting Services: Have Courts Struck the Proper Balance?, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 627,
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scholars have remarked on the relative institutional roles that legislatures, agencies, and courts play in resolving disputes involving networked communications.9 But scholars have avoided or been silent
on the point in the context of video distribution.
The problem with this myopic focus on substantive policy outcomes is that it has a very narrow view of what the Internet is. I assume here that it is far more than an innovation machine.10 The Internet constitutes and inhabits all aspects of our public and private
lives. Parties accordingly are now more than ever asking courts to resolve high-stakes disputes like those at issue in the Aereo litigation because innovation is an indeterminate objective. What is more, these
disputes involve competing public policy priorities and interests for
which there is often no easy answer in existing law. The focus on substantive policy outcomes accordingly ignores the far more relevant
question today of how to make legal sense of laws when novel communication technologies like live video streaming emerge and the
pertinent existing public laws provide no clear answer. I propose
here a reform that would have courts leave these problems to Congress and the agencies to whom it has delegated the responsibility of
resolving such questions in the first instance. This Article considers
the recent video distribution cases and Aereo in particular to explain
the point.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I illustrate that, in
the recent online streaming video cases, courts proceeded in their
analysis of the public performance right on the assumption that they
are best situated to resolve questions about novel technologies. I focus in particular on the recent litigation involving Aereo.
631 (2012); Sebastian Wyatt Novak, Note, “A Million Little Antennas:” The Second Circuit’s
Decision in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., and the Next Great United States Supreme Court Copyright Battle, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 287 (2013).
9. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257
(2007) (using the theory of economic externalities to posit a theory of IP property rights
distribution); Thomas Fetzer & Christopher S. Yoo, New Technologies and Constitutional Law,
in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 485 (Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner
& Cheryl Saunders eds., 2013); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy,
2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, at ¶ 30 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805–06,
855 (2004); Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
91, 96 (2010); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 751 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822 (2001); A. Michael
Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000); Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2164 (2004); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (2009).
10. Cf. Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2015).
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In Part II, I situate the Transmit Clause in its historical and legislative context. I show that it was just one part of a broader reform addressed to the emergence of cable television and the consequent shift
in the political economy of broadcast programming distribution. I also show that Congress later amended the Copyright Act as well as the
Communications Act to account for the emergence of disruptive video programming distribution technologies. And while it has incorporated the Internet and networked communications technologies in
these amendments, I show that Congress has yet to amend the scope
of broadcast transmission law to include the Internet. Instead, Congress has deferred that responsibility to the Copyright Office and the
FCC. And, accordingly, both agencies have had a thing or two to say
about broadcasters’ relative rights in the market for online video distribution.11 These agency findings, I argue, should make courts far
more sanguine than they have been about deciding the scope of the
public performance right de novo, as though they are the only act in
town.
In Part III, I demonstrate that courts already have developed an
appreciation for the limits of their relative institutional authority and
capacity in other information law subfields like electronic communication surveillance and broadband network management. This underscores the inadequacy of the courts’ approach to the public performance right. Thus, later in Part III, I propose that courts interpose
interpretations by the Copyright Office and the FCC concerning the
proper legal treatment of online video streaming under the sister
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Communications Act. In the
end, my argument here is for more humility in courts’ consideration
of disputes concerning disruptive video distribution technologies than
they have evinced to this point.
I. AEREO AND THE CASE OF ONLINE VIDEO STREAMING
Viewers today have far more control over when and how they
watch television sitcoms, dramas, live sports, and movies than they did
a generation ago.12 User adoption of digital video recorders like

11. The Copyright Office, for example, does not think the compulsory licensing law
under the Copyright Act, the sister provision of the public performance right, covers internet transmissions. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND
REAUTHORIZATION
ACT
SECTION
109
REPORT
(2008),
available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/section109-final-report.pdf.
12. See Alex Williams, For Millennials, the End of the TV Viewing Party, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/fashion/for-millennials-the-end-of-the-tvviewing-party.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share&smprod=nytcore-ipad&_r=0.
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TiVO and DVR cable service is not the only reason for this shift. Networked devices manufactured by Simple.tv and Roku, internet-based
video-on-demand applications like those offered by Hulu and Amazon, and “over-the-top” online video services like those being developed by Sony and Verizon enable users to watch live or record-andplayback television programming whenever and however they want.13
According to one recent report, subscribers with high-speed internet
connections now outnumber those with cable television.14
Until last summer, online streaming video distribution applications like Aereo and FilmOn were at the vanguard of such services.
Aereo transcoded over-the-air broadcast signals into a digital form for
subscribers who, in turn, wanted to watch on their laptops or other
mobile devices. For many observers, however, Aereo’s online streaming service was nothing more than a tool used by its developers to exploit broadcasters’ proprietary content without paying for it.15 Accordingly, broadcast networks and their affiliated local stations filed
lawsuits across the country alleging that Aereo and FilmOn infringed
their exclusive right under the Copyright Act to perform broadcast
programs publicly.16 In many regards, the broadcasters’ strategy
proved very successful: Aereo has shuttered its business and filed for
bankruptcy at the end of 2014.17
The problem is that the pertinent provision, the Transmit Clause
of the 1976 Copyright Act,18 is not particularly clear about how courts
ought to consider user-controlled video applications like Aereo. The
statute’s definition of what constitutes a public performance is inap-

13. Id.
14. Shalini Ramachandran, More Cable Companies Take TV Off Menu, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
3,
2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/more-cable-companies-take-tv-off-menu1412120310.
15. Cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (broadcasters brought suit against cable operators for violating public performance right under
1909 Copyright Act); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390
(1968) (same); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL
255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (broadcasters brought suit against first generation of online
streaming video sites).
16. See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Fox Television Stations v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.,
874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 386–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
17. See infra note 120.
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (public performance right); 17 U.S.C.
§ 101(2)(2012) (providing that to perform publicly under § 106 of the Copyright Act is “to
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public,
by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the
same time or at different times”).
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posite to the workings and predominant consumer uses of online video.19 Congress, after all, drafted it in an era when broadcasters controlled the time and manner by which the public watched broadcast
fare.20 Aereo ostensibly did something new; their subscribers could
watch broadcast network sports or TV dramas in whatever idiosyncratic way they chose: they could watch live or watch at a later time from
any point in the program.21 And they could do all of this on virtually
any device that has an internet connection.22
The Transmit Clause is ambiguous enough on the question that
judges across the country were divided on how to handle the various
cases that broadcasters brought.23 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit and a district court in Massachusetts decided
that the provision does not include the new applications, while district
courts in the District of Columbia and California decided that they
do.24
The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on appeal from the Second Circuit in January of 2014 and, in a 6–3 decision, sided with broadcasters. In his opinion for the majority, Justice
Breyer likened Aereo to cable service, the video distribution technology that Congress explicitly brought under coverage of the 1976 Copyright Act.25 The “behind-the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers television programming to its viewers’ screens” was unknown to
policymakers in 1976, but, he asserted, the general act of retransmitting broadcast signals to subscribers without authorization was not.26
Justice Scalia, writing for the three dissenters, rejected the analogy to cable, choosing instead to liken Aereo’s service to a “copy shop”

19. See supra note 18.
20. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)).
21. See Jerry Markon, Robert Barnes, & Cecilia Kang, Supreme Court Rules Against StartUp Aereo, Saying It Is Violating Copyright Laws, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/supreme-court-rules-against-startup-aereosaying-it-is-violating-copyright-laws/2014/06/25/59756f88-fc6b-11e3-8176f2c941cf35f1_story.html (explaining that Aereo rebroadcasts live television at a cheap
monthly rate, where the subscribers can access these programs more conveniently).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).
24. Compare id., with Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30
(D.D.C. 2013).
25. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“This history makes
clear that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider. Rather, Aereo, and not just its subscribers, ‘perform[s]’ (or ‘transmit[s]’). Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those
of the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach.”).
26. Id. at 2508.
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that allows customers to use a copier on its premises.27 Such stores
would not be infringing any more than Aereo is.28
As interesting as the substantive question about the scope of protection under current law is or ought to be, both the majority opinion
and dissent overlooked the important role that federal agencies play
in the legislative field. The Copyright Office and the FCC have for
decades been applying the Copyright Act and the Communications
Act to disruptive video distribution technologies. For better or worse,
Congress long ago decided that these agencies are best situated to
understand new video applications as they emerge, monitor their impact on the market, and recalibrate the scope of legal protections in
furtherance of legislative purposes.29 They are charged with making
legal sense of new technologies in the first instance.30
The Justices and all of the federal judges who have heard the
question, however, showed no respect for this arrangement. Indeed,
neither the Aereo majority opinion nor the dissent even acknowledged
it. They instead chose to interpret the scope of the public performance right without any real consideration of the agencies’ findings
or reports on the question.31 I posit here that they did so based on
the myopic assumption that they alone have the duty of finding the
proper balance between owners and creators in the first instance—or
at least that they are as well situated as anyone else to make legal sense
of disruptive new technologies.32
A. The Aereo Service
Aereo streamed over-the-air broadcast programming to its paying
subscribers.33 The company relied on three important design features
to provide the service. First, it assigned an individual antenna to a
subscriber once it received a request from that subscriber to watch or
record a program.34 Subscribers would make their request by clicking
a computer mouse or tapping their mobile device’s display.35 No two
users would share the same antenna at the same time, even if they re-

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2513–14.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504–11.
See infra Part I.D.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
Id.
See id.
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quested to watch or record the very same program at the same time.36
Second, Aereo transcoded the broadcast signal of the requested program and created an individual digital copy of that program in the
requesting subscriber’s personal directory.37 Again, even when two
users are watching or recording the same program at the same time,
the stream that they receive through Aereo flows from the copy of the
program in their own Aereo directory.38 Finally, a subscriber could
watch the copy of the desired program on his TV, computer, or mobile-device screen; no other Aereo user could ever view that particular
copy.39 In short, Aereo afforded users control over when and through
which device they watched programs.40 And it did so without authorization from broadcasters.
Aereo designed their service in this way in order to abide by the
terms of the Second Circuit’s decision in a 2008 case involving a cable
television remote storage digital video recorder service (“RS-DVR”).41
Cablevision, the principle defendant in that case, provided subscribers with RS-DVR service to copy and transmit broadcast and nonbroadcast programming.42 The Cablevision panel concluded that this
service did not constitute a public performance within the meaning of
the Copyright Act because, first, individual subscribers make their
own copy of a broadcast network program through a click of their
remote control and, second, the RS-DVR service automatically transmits that individual copy to the unique subscriber whenever the latter
requests it.43 Cable operators have virtually no active role in an automated individual transmission.
As novel as its service seemed, Aereo’s entry into the market was
not terribly surprising. First, applications for online streaming of
broadcast and nonbroadcast television content had been available for

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing
expert reports); see also Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for
the Delivery of Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 4401, 4408 (2009).
41. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (referred to colloquially as “Cablevision”).
42. Id. at 124.
43. In a useful analogy, the Cablevision court likened RS-DVR service to a store that
charges customers to use a photocopier on-site. Id. at 132. As with such a store, Cablevision could not be held liable for violating plaintiffs’ rights under the Copyright Act because RS-DVR service automates subscriber requests, effectively removing any volitional
conduct on the part of Cablevision. Id.
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years already.44 Second, cable companies and broadcasters already
were engaged in a very fraught battle over licensing and retransmission terms in ways that disadvantaged consumers. Specifically, broadcasters and other programmers blacked out their signals to gain leverage in their negotiations over retransmission.45 Aereo simply
sought to capitalize on the dispute, advertising itself as the modernday alternative to the greedy old incumbents.46
Legislators in Congress, meanwhile, had been (and continue to
be) considering bills that would address online video distribution.
One bill would forbid cable and satellite operators, broadband providers, and other major media companies from engaging in anticompetitive practices against online video distributors, effectively giving
the latter the same protections afforded to satellite providers.47 It
would also open the possibility for online video distributors to negotiate with broadcasters on streaming terms. The basic objective of this
proposal is to afford users a mix of choices for video programming.
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce, meanwhile, released a white paper that detailed current inadequacies in the
amended Communications Act, focusing in particular on the way in
which the 1934 Act treats different communications platforms (i.e.,
broadcasting, cable, and wireless) differently.48
B. The Lawsuit
Broadcasters were not going to wait for legislative action. The
major networks and their affiliated local stations in the largest television markets sued Aereo and FilmOn, another prominent online vid44. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000
WL 255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
45. See Christopher Zara, Fox News Blackout Takes a Bite Out of Dish Network’s Pay-TV Subscribers, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/fox-news-blackouttakes-bite-out-dish-networks-pay-tv-subscribers-1827108.
46. Aereo took out a full-page New York Times advertisement to emphasize the point.
Greg Sandoval, News War: Aereo Takes out Full-Page New York Times Ad as Network Threats Heat
up, THE VERGE (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/18/4238774/aereotakes-out-full-page-new-york-times-ad-against-network-threats.
47. Consumer Choice in Online Video Act, S. 1680, 113th Cong. (2013); cf. Bryce Baschuk, Rockefeller Unveils Aereo Friendly Online Video Legislation for Expanded Choice,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.bna.com/rockefeller-unveils-aereon17179880063/.
48. H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, MODERNIZING THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
(2014),
available
at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/a
nalysis/CommActUpdate/20140108WhitePaper.pdf (“The primary body of law regulating
these industries was passed in 1934 and while updated periodically, it has not been modernized in 17 years.”).
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eo streaming service, within a year after those services first became
available. In cases filed in federal district courts in New York, Boston,
Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere broadcasters alleged
that Aereo and FilmOn directly infringed on broadcasters’ right to
perform their programs publicly every time the upstarts streamed
broadcast content without permission.49
The pertinent statutory provision of the Copyright Act, the
Transmit Clause, defines the right to perform work “publicly” as,
[the right] to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in
the same place or in separate places and at the same time or
at different times.50
According to plaintiffs, Aereo’s method of distributing broadcast programming to subscribers violates the plain terms of the statute. It
makes no difference, they alleged, if Aereo uses one big antenna (like
a cable company, for example) or many small antennas to receive
broadcast signals if, in either case, the company is retransmitting the
same program to members of the public.51
The district courts to hear the cases were of two minds: some
were inclined to reject plaintiffs’ suit, while others were alarmed by
the new online video applications at issue. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York denied broadcasters’ motion for a preliminary injunction, relying on the Second Circuit’s
opinion from 2008 in Cablevision.52 It found that the similarities between the RS-DVR service in that earlier case and Aereo’s streaming
service were significant. The latter’s subscribers, it explained, can
stop, store, and playback programs in the same way that cable sub-

49. WNET Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at ¶¶ 43–48, Am. Broad. Cos.
v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 1543) (citing 17
U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 502 (2012)). American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (“ABC”) and
WNET were co-plaintiffs in a suit against Aereo, Inc. Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 375–76.
WNET also alleged infringement of their reproduction right under the Act as well as unfair competition, WNET Compl., supra, at ¶¶ 49–63, but the public performance claim
drew the most attention. See also WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d
Cir. 2013).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). For the purposes of the act, “publicly” refers to “at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered.” Id. § 101(1).
51. WNET Compl., supra note 49, at ¶ 3.
52. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87. Plaintiffs chose not to pursue their reproduction right at the preliminary injunction stage. See id. at 376 (discussing the limited
scope of the opinion).
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scribers can control video through DVR service.53 A few months later,
the United States District Court for the District of Boston reached the
same conclusion.54
Broadcasters found success in cases in D.C. and California. A
judge in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, for example, found that FilmOn infringed broadcasters’
public performance right.55 Explicitly rejecting the Second Circuit’s
reading of the Transmit Clause in Cablevision, the L.A.-based court
explained that the underlying work and its transmission are not separate “performances” under Section 101; the statute is addressed to
“the performance of the copyrighted work, irrespective of which copy
of the work the transmission is made from.”56 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found the California court’s
reasoning persuasive, but nevertheless provided its own rationale for
its decision.57 That court also imposed a nationwide injunction on
online video streaming services like those provided by FilmOn and
Aereo, excepting, of course, the states in the Second Circuit.58 (The
California district court for its part had limited its injunction to the
Ninth Circuit.59) Aereo, meanwhile, filed defensive lawsuits across the
country, seeking to stave off the broadcasters’ expensive no-holds-bar
litigation strategy.60
Broadcasters appealed the adverse decisions. Even while most
federal courts across the country had not endorsed the Second Circuit’s Cablevision approach, broadcasters could not tolerate an adverse

53. Id. at 386.
54. See Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D. Mass. 2013).
55. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d
1138, 1143–44 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing Cablevision). It decided the case before the Second Circuit published its opinion in April 2013.
56. Id. at 1144. FilmOn appealed the district court decision to the Ninth Circuit. In
light of Ninth Circuit precedent with which the Second Circuit explicitly disagreed in Cablevision, see Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 138–39 (2d. Cir. 2008) (distinguishing On Command
Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991)), it was probable that the two most prominent federal appellate courts on intellectual property matters
would have been split on the scope of the public performance right. Such a split never
came to pass, however, as the Ninth Circuit stayed the case before it pending the Supreme
Court’s resolution of the appeal from the Second Circuit.
57. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33, 37, 44–52
(D.D.C. 2013).
58. Id. at 52.
59. See BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
60. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Aereo, Inc. v. CBS Broadcasting,
No. 13-CV-3013 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013).
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decision in the jurisdiction with the largest television market.61 They
also fine-tuned their argument, focusing in particular on the live
streaming aspect of Aereo’s service (as opposed to the record-andplayback function).62
A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s decision.63 The user control features of Aereo’s online streaming service,
it held, are sufficiently similar to make Cablevision dispositive as a matter of stare decisis.64 The panel explained that, under Cablevision, the
“to the public” language in the Transmit Clause refers to the potential
audience for the original transmission and not to the underlying program.65 The provision, it explained, cannot be read to include any
and all transmissions of the same underlying program because such a
reading could transform even private transmissions into public ones—
say, when a viewer watches the program on another device in her
house through her home network.66 To allow such a reading, the
panel explained, would effectively render the “to the public language”
superfluous.67 The only performance addressed in the provision, it
explained, is created by the original act of transmission from broadcaster to the airwaves, not to the subsequent transmissions triggered
by the user’s request to play a recorded copy of the original transmission.68 The court reasoned that, as in Cablevision, Aereo enables
unique users to receive and watch their own transmission of the desired broadcast.69
The Aereo panel also briefly examined the text and history of the
Transmit Clause. Echoing Cablevision, it explained that Congress explicitly addressed the provision to “the emergence of cable television
systems” in the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s.70 Congress made
their intentions all the clearer, moreover, when, at the same time, it
61. See Brian Stelter, Aereo Wins Court Battle, Dismaying Broadcasters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/media/aereo-wins-in-appealscourt-setting-stage-for-trial-on-streaming-broadcast-tv.html?_r=0 (“The broadcasters, surprised and disappointed, said they were confident they would prevail eventually.”).
62. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“This history
makes clear that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider. Rather, Aereo, and not just
its subscribers, ‘perform[s]’ (or ‘transmit[s].’)”).
63. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686–87, 696 (2d Cir. 2013).
64. Id. at 695.
65. Id. at 687 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2008)).
66. Id. at 688.
67. Id. at 687–88 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135–36).
68. Id. at 688–89 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138).
69. Id. at 689–90.
70. Id. at 685 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676).

730

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:715

created a whole new compulsory licensing regime that would enable
“cable systems” to retransmit broadcast programming.71 Together,
the panel explained, the Transmit Clause and Section 111 were to
moderate the high-stakes contest between broadcasters and cable operators.72 Congress, the panel continued, did no such thing for any
other video distribution technologies at that time; it did not express
any sense for how to structure a broad and all-inclusive statutory licensing regime that could accommodate “unanticipated technological developments” like online video streaming.73 The design of the
Aereo service could not have been anticipated.74 And this was not a
small point for the panel: the difference between “public and private
transmissions” in the 1970s “was simpler than today.”75
Judge Denny Chin wrote a forceful dissenting opinion.76 He
agreed that Congress incorporated the public performance right and
corollary compulsory licensing regime in the 1976 Copyright Act in
order to address cable retransmission of broadcast signals.77 But, he
continued, the majority’s decision privileges form over substance as it
would allow unauthorized retransmissions through “a Rube Goldberglike contrivance, over-engineered . . . to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act.”78 For him, Cablevision is inapplicable because the RS-DVR
service in that case supplements the real-time service for which cable
systems pay statutory licensing fees under Section 111 and retransmission consent fees under the Communications Act.79
In any event, Judge Chin continued, Congress explicitly sought
to incorporate “all conceivable forms and combinations of wires and
wireless communications media” in their definition of “transmit.”80
Congress, he argued, had a broad conception of public performance
71. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2012)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 694–95.
74. Id. at 694.
75. Id. at 694–95.
76. Id. at 696 (Chin, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 704; cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394
(1974) (holding that cable service that retransmitted broadcast signal outside local area
was not a public performance within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (holding that cable operator’s
retransmission of broadcast signal is not a public performance within the meaning of the
1909 Copyright Act).
78. Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting). It is worth mentioning here that, in
Cablevision, the Second Circuit reversed then-District Court Judge Chin’s decision for
broadcasters. Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 2008).
79. Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting); see also 47 U.S.C. §325(b)(6) (2012).
80. Aereo, 712 F.3d at 701 (Chin, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678).
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that, according to the legislative history, included any transmissions to
the public, no matter whether individuals can watch and record at different times or in different places.81 While it did not foresee video
streaming over the Internet, he conceded, Congress surely meant to
include streaming in their definition of public performance under
Section 101.82
The Aereo majority’s short response to the dissent was that, after
Cablevision, “technical architecture matters.”83 The majority noted the
plaintiffs’ argument that Aereo in all likelihood designed its system
with that earlier case in mind—that is, its engineers quite plainly designed around the concerns that the Second Circuit identified in Cablevision.84 But that, the majority continued, was not itself incriminating; this is not the first time that a company has developed a business
plan or designed an information sharing technology with an eye to
existing law.85 Aereo provided just one of many emergent cloud
computer services that Cablevision had arguably instigated.86 Like
those other services, the panel suggested, the company merely enables subscribers to control how they watch broadcast programs.87
C. The Supreme Court
The plaintiffs in the Second Circuit case filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari that the Supreme Court promptly granted early in 2014.88
The Court heard argument in the case in April and, a couple months
later, reversed the Second Circuit in a 6–3 decision.89
The majority, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, was not as taken by
the uniqueness of Aereo’s design as the Second Circuit panel majority
had been.90 Aereo’s one user, one antenna design, it explained, does
not make the transmission less “public” for the purposes of the

81. Id. at 698–99.
82. Id. at 698.
83. Id. at 694 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 693–94.
85. Id. at 694.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 692.
88. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). Interestingly, Aereo did
not object to the petition. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo,
Inc., No. 13-461 (Oct. 11, 2013). Plaintiffs had filed a motion for rehearing with the full
Second Circuit that the court promptly rejected. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d
500 (2d Cir. 2013).
89. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.
90. Id. at 2507–08.
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Transmit Clause.91 The peculiar “behind-the-scenes way in which
Aereo delivers television programming to its viewers’ screens” does
“not render Aereo’s commercial objective any different from that of
cable companies.”92 The company’s service, it explained, does not
“significantly alter the viewing experience of Aereo’s subscribers.”93
The Transmit Clause’s language was not addressed solely to the original performance of the underlying work, the majority continued, but
to every manner in which that underlying work is conveyed to members of the public.94 Congress made this clear, the majority explained,
by asserting in the statute that a public performance occurs “whether
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . .
receive it . . . at the same time or at different times.”95 In this regard,
the Court noted, Congress specifically sought to overturn two prior
Supreme Court opinions in which the Court refused to hold cable
operators liable for violating the public performance rights of broadcasters under the old statute.96 In the 1976 statute, the majority continued, Congress sought to impose liability on operators as well as
subscribers for performing work—that cable operators were not merely making equipment available to viewers, but also impermissibly
transmitting signals to viewers.97
Accordingly, the Court explained, since Aereo “performs” broadcast programs “publicly” in the same way that cable operators do, it is
bound by the same provisions of the Copyright Act—that is, neither
Aereo nor any other online video distributors like it may retransmit
broadcast signals without broadcasters’ authorization.98
The majority limited the scope of its holding in the face of concerns from amici and others that a decision against Aereo might also
impose unintended restrictions on cloud computing services generally.99 The distinction between the online video distribution at issue
and other internet-based services was not hard to make: unlike the latter, the majority explained, Aereo’s subscribers do not have any proprietary interest in the underlying works that Aereo makes available.100
91. Id. at 2501.
92. Id. at 2508.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2509.
95. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. at 2505–06.
97. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5676).
98. Id. at 2511.
99. Id. at 2518 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2510 (majority opinion).
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The Transmit Clause “does not extend to those who act as owners or
possessors of the relevant product”; it could only be addressed to “cable companies and their equivalents.”101 This means that, at a minimum, the provision covers entities that “communicate[] . . . contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds” of a work in the same
way that cable providers do.102 In any event, the majority observed,
the fair use doctrine provides a fail-safe mechanism against “inappropriate or inequitable applications of the Clause.”103
Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion that Justices Thomas
and Alito joined. In it, he rejected the majority’s conclusion that
Aereo could directly infringe on broadcasters’ performance rights if
subscribers, not Aereo, trigger the transmission of the underlying
work.104 The right question, he argued, was instead about the scope
of secondary liability, not direct liability.105 This is an important distinction, Justice Scalia explained, because Aereo does not engage in
volitional conduct.106 Its “automated, user-controlled system,” he continued, places the decisive volitional conduct in the hands of the subscriber.107 Aereo, for its part, Justice Scalia concluded, does not have
the requisite amount of intentionality to be directly liable for direct
infringement.108 He reasoned that it “does not ‘perform’ for the sole
and simple reason that it does not make the choice of content.”109
This is far different, he noted, than the cable services that gave rise to
the Transmit Clause in 1976.110 Those services, Justice Scalia explained, actively defined the video content they supplied to subscribers.111
In the end, Justice Scalia reserved his most caustic criticism for
the majority’s “guilt by resemblance” approach to copyright law.112
Among other things, he observed, the House Report to which the majority only cited once could not be reflective of congressional intent at
the time.113 In any event, he explained, the majority’s decision to turn
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. at 2509.
Id. at 2511.
Id. at 2512–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2514.
Id. at 2512–13.
Id. at 2513.
Id. at 2514.
Id.
Id. at 2515.
Id. at 2515–16.
Id. at 2515–17.
Id.
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“performance” on a “cable-TV-lookalike rule” does not provide much
clarity for other online video distribution services.114
D. Agency Work (or, What the Aereo Opinions Did Not Mention)
The authors of the majority and dissenting opinions reached
their conclusions in the absence of any clear precedent on the question of how broadly the public performance right reaches. Justice
Breyer thought it was important to identify and make sense of the
Transmit Clause’s general legislative purpose in the context of the
new technology.115 He wondered whether Aereo’s service was much
different from cable, and concluded that it was not.116 It did not matter that online video streaming was unknown to lawmakers in 1976.
He just presumed that, under the Copyright Act, users must have an
underlying relationship with the work in question in order to avoid
liability under the Transmit Clause, although no court has ever required as much.
Justice Scalia’s dissent, on the other hand, was characteristically
dismissive of the use of legislative history as a methodology for interpreting the meaning of the Transmit Clause.117 He determined that
the semantic meaning of the operative verb in the Transmit Clause—
“perform”—required a volitional act on the part of the alleged infringer even though, not unlike the majority opinion, the Supreme
Court has never adverted as much.118
In this regard, the Breyer and Scalia opinions in Aereo were just
the latest installments in the longstanding feud between the two
about judicial interpretive approach. They were both unwaveringly
confident in their authority to make legal sense of the new technology

114. Id. at 2516. Justice Scalia posited that the “cable-TV-lookalike rule” as such would
not resolve whether a record-and-playback service like that offered by Aereo (but not on
review on appeal) infringes on broadcasters’ public performance right. Id. at 2516–17.
Under current law, however, that sort of “time shifting” would likely be a permissible fair
use. The majority seemed to agree as much with this point. Accord id. at 2511 (majority
opinion) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
115. Id. at 2502–10.
116. Id. at 2507. Courts have often felt compelled to make analogies to conventional
communications technologies in order to make legal sense of the internet. This has the
unfortunate effect of underappreciating the novel particularities of the specific online service or application at issue.
117. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(referring to “the severe shortcomings” of reliance on legislative history as an “interpretive methodology”).
118. But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there
should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s
system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”).
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without consultation of anything more than the statute and their own
interpretive methodology.119
This preoccupation was put in full relief in the Aereo case because
federal agencies—that is, important institutional interpreters of public law other than courts—have over the past decade or so sought to
clarify how to treat online video distributors under the Copyright Act
or the Communications Act. The Copyright Office, as I explain in
more detail in Part III below, has for over the past decade repeatedly
observed that online video distributors are not “cable systems” within
the meaning of Section 111 of the Copyright Act, the sister provision
of the Transmit Clause. Those agency decisions clearly are at odds or
at least inconsistent with the majority’s decision in Aereo. The FCC for
its part has been administering a proceeding on whether online video
distributors owe the same duties to broadcasters that cable operators
and other multichannel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”)
do. As with their silence on the Copyright Office’s implementation of
Section 111, the Justices’ omission of these proceedings borders on
remarkable. The Justices’ silence on the role that these agencies have
been playing since the advent of the online video distribution is all
the more notable in light of the fact that both Justices Breyer and
Scalia are former scholars and teachers of administrative law.
To put the matter more starkly: neither Aereo opinion gave any
consideration to whether the courts are the right or best institutions
for deciding how to treat online video streaming in the face of so
much agency work on the matter. The Justices took for granted that
they are. And, as it goes, they were not alone. None of the other trial
or appellate courts to hear the cases against Aereo or FilmOn before
the Supreme Court’s decision last summer gave any meaningful consideration (never mind deference) to agency actions on the matter.120
119. See supra Part I.C.
120. See supra Part I.B. After the Supreme Court decision, Aereo sought to amend its
pleadings to allege that it qualified for a compulsory license under Section 111. Joint Letter
of
Parties
at
3
(July
9,
2014)
(No.
12-cv-1540),
available
at
http://blog.aereo.com/2014/07/3784/. In the litigation that led to the Supreme Court
decision, Aereo had argued that it could not qualify as a cable system. The company
thought it could invoke the provision as an affirmative defense to broadcasters’ motion for
an injunction, particularly after the Supreme Court held that Aereo is like a cable system
for the purposes of the Transmit Clause. It argued that, if they are a cable system under
the Copyright Act, they are entitled to the benefits of the statutory license under 111(c). It
accordingly filed statements of account and royalty fees with the Copyright Office. The
agency promptly rejected the request. “[I]nternet retransmissions of broadcast television,”
it explained, “fall outside the scope of the Section 111 license.” Letter from General
Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, United States
Copyright Office, to Matthew Calabro, Aereo, Inc. (July 16, 2014), available at
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/071614_Aereo_Copyright_Office_lette
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My argument here is that courts should, as a matter of course, attend to the agencies that Congress set in motion in the Copyright Act
and the Communications Act. Courts and information law scholars
have attended to the relative institutional roles that legislatures, agencies, and courts play in resolving disputes arising from disruptive networked communications technologies in a variety of other substantive
legislative fields.121 No one, however, has done so for the public performance right. To the extent legal commentators have written about
the online video streaming cases, they focus on what the right substantive policy ought to be; they ask whether courts have struck the
proper balance between content owners, innovators, and the public.122
That this has been the narrow focus of scholarship is no surprise.
The preoccupation with finding the best positive substantive outcome
(irrespective of legal process and governance) is the staple of information law scholarship. The most enduring law review article in the
area argued that policymakers ought to promulgate more than statutory prohibitions because today’s software writers and computer engineers are demonstrably too wily to be daunted by them.123 Legislators
and policymakers, this scholar argued, ought to implement “soft”
forms of regulation that foster innovation.124

r.pdf. The company filed for bankruptcy soon afterward. Tanya Agrawal & Jonathan
Stempel, Video streaming service Aereo files for bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/21/us-aereo-bankruptcyidUSKCN0J513K20141121. In spite of this filing, broadcasters continue to prosecute their
substantive infringement claim. See Broadcasters’ Motion for Relief from Stay Pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) and Memorandum of Law, In re Aereo, Inc., Case No. 14-13200
(S.D.N.Y.
2014),
available
at
http://ia601409.us.archive.org/12/items/gov.uscourts.nysb.254268/gov.uscourts.nysb.254
268.47.0.pdf.
121. See, e.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 9; Fetzer & Yoo, supra note 9; Freiwald,
supra note 9; Kerr, supra note 9; Mazzone, supra note 9; Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra
note 9; Solove, supra note 9.
122. See, e.g., Novak, supra note 8; Rasenberger & Pepe, supra note 8, at, 641–43.
123. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 513–14 (1999); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998)
(“[L]aw and government regulation are not the only source of rulemaking. Technological
capabilities and system design choices impose rules on participants. The creation and implementation of information policy are embedded in network designs and standards as
well as in system configurations.”).
124. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 175 (2006) (“Code can, and increasingly will, displace
law as the primary defense of intellectual property in cyberspace. Private fences, not public law.”); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 184 (1999);
Joel R. Reidenberg, supra note 123, at 554–55.

2015]

DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE

737

But, today, over three decades since its commercialization, the
Internet is far more than an innovation machine that policymakers
must regulate delicately.125 Today, as is quite evident in the growth of
the market for online video, the Internet is now fully integrated into
public life. At least for now, the transmission protocol on which the
Internet is based is the dominant means of distributing information.126 Parties are now more than ever asking courts to resolve
high-stakes communication technology disputes in a variety of settings
presumably because there is no obvious answer to what the proper
policy balance ought to be.127
The overwhelming focus on substantive policy outcomes ignores
the far more pertinent question today of how courts ought to make
legal sense of laws when technologies change and prevailing public
law objectives are in tension. These are difficult questions to answer.
They are all the trickier for judges when sophisticated and wellresourced public interest groups, trade associations, and transnational
conglomerates bring to bear their own interests to the question.
Congress delegated first-instance policymaking authority to the
Copyright Office and the FCC precisely for these reasons. And this is
also why courts have deferred to those agencies (under Chevron, for
example).128 But this is why the Aereo opinions are so remarkable; the
Justices evinced no awareness of this background.
The Aereo case accordingly provides an opportunity to consider
the ways in which courts might develop a more careful approach to
making legal sense of disruptive technologies when statutes are ambiguous. I outline in Part III what such an approach would look like.
In short, I argue that courts ought to determine at the outset, before
deciding the substantive question, whether the agencies that Congress
has charged with filling in gaps in video distribution law have addressed or are in the process of addressing the matter.129 Before set125. Cf. Sylvain, supra note 10.
126. See, e.g., Order, Technology Transitions, 29 FCC Rcd. 1433 (2014) (ordering experimentation for the transition from traditional time-division multiplexed circuitswitched voice services to an Internet protocol based voice service).
127. See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Viacom Int’l v. Youtube,
Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
128. City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, , 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (applying Chevron deference to the FCC’s rulemaking on cellphone tower siting provision in the Communications
Act); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 279-85 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying Chevron and
Skidmore deference to Copyright Office’s findings regarding §111 of the Copyright Act).
See generally GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.20, n.7 (3d Edition 2005) (observing that, while
“[c]ircuits divide on the deference to be given to the Copyright Office[,] . . . some courts
give so-called ‘Chevron deference’”).
129. See infra Part III.C.
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ting out the contours of this proposal, however, I show in Part II below that the Copyright Office and the FCC have, indeed, been very active in the legislative field of video distribution for decades.
II. VIDEO DISTRIBUTION LAW IN FOCUS
Contemporary legal disputes involving novel communications
technologies generally arise from disagreements between individual
users, entrepreneurs, and engineers over the meaning or scope of existing public law. It is no surprise that new technologies could trigger
such heated, high-stakes disagreement. The original language and
purpose of laws concerning networked communications were not designed to address modern-day realities.
Courts employ different interpretive strategies to resolve such
disputes depending on the nature of the particular statutory provision
at issue and in consideration of the applicable institutional constraints. On the one hand, they might take it upon themselves to resolve a matter in the first instance without consulting anyone else.
Or, on the other hand, they might consult or defer to other institutions (i.e., administrative agencies) on the assumption that the latter
are better suited to resolving such disputes in the first instance than
courts are.
But, in Aereo, the Supreme Court did not evince any awareness
that they had a choice in the matter. Neither the majority nor the
dissent gave a moment’s consideration to whether it (or any federal
courts) should defer to or even consider the work of the Copyright
Office or the Federal Communications Commission on video distribution law.130 They presumably believed that it was their responsibility
to resolve the contest between broadcasters and the developers of
online video distribution applications, in spite of the regulatory regimes that Congress created solely for that purpose. To give some
context for this glaringly immodest view of their relative institutional
role, here, in this Part, I outline the public law that they ignored.
A. The History and Political Economy of Video Distribution
Broadcast radio and television have played an important role in
defining American public life for several decades now. But Congress
enshrined the political economy of broadcast distribution in the Radio Act of 1927, and then the Communications Act of 1934.131 In
both, broadcasters were to be the vital trustees of the public airwaves.
130. See supra Part I.C.
131. See Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162; Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064.
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A station could only obtain a license to use a frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum if it could demonstrate to the FCC (and the
Federal Radio Commission before it) that it would act in the public
interest.132
This regulatory arrangement was the backdrop for the advertising-based broadcast network system of the twentieth century. The
major broadcast networks entered into exclusive agreements with local station affiliates across the country to distribute original programming. The networks and their affiliates supported this system by
selling time during the airing of their programs to advertisers. Audience size translated into revenue; the bigger and more captive the
audience, the greater the revenue to broadcasters.
The popularity of programming was therefore essential to the
flow of revenue. The major studios did everything they could to keep
audiences coming back for more. Daytime programming was important, of course. But, in this scheme, the most lucrative airtime was
(and, for broadcasters, still is) in the evening: primetime, after people
had come home from work and eaten dinner.
American viewers generally abided by this schedule, organizing
their waking lives around weekly listings in TV Guide and the local
newspaper. Television was the great electronic hearth by which viewers, together, enthusiastically basked in a shared American culture.
Anchormen like Walter Cronkite supplied reassurance during difficult times. Popular episodic comedies like The Honeymooners and I
Love Lucy made fun and sense of the times. The American public experienced primetime television in one sitting as a single community.
Of course, there were minorities, outliers, and dissenters who did not
follow mainstream television programming.133 For the most part,
however, broadcast television was an important galvanizing force in
American life.134
The Internet and online video in particular have dramatically redefined the way in which viewers interact and watch video programming.135 Of course, broadcast television programming continues to
play an important part in American popular culture today. Just ask
the contestants on Dancing with the Stars or any one of the Real Housewives. But it does not occupy the defining position in the culture that
132. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
133. Olivier Sylvain, Contingency and the “Networked Information Economy”: A Critique of
The Wealth of Networks, 4 INT’L J. TECH., KNOWLEDGE & SOC’Y 203 (2008).
134. Cf. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1982).
135. See Tim Wu, Netflix’s War on Mass Culture, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115687/netflixs-war-mass-culture.
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it once did. The key difference is that viewers more than ever watch
video content on their laptops and mobile phones at the time of their
choosing.136 At a minimum, the attraction of live or prime time television as such is not as salient to young adult viewers.137
To be clear, online streaming of broadcast programming has existed for only a little more than a decade.138 It still comprises a small
fraction of TV viewing today.139 But so much more seems to be at
stake today, as the number of online video viewers will continue to increase in the coming years.140
The popularity of online video content has grown so much over
just the past decade or so that it is now cutting into markets long
dominated by broadcasters. Companies like Hulu, Amazon, and Netflix have for the past seven or so years supplied internet-enabled platforms for streaming episodic shows and feature films. In the past two
years, they have developed their own critically acclaimed original episodic programs like House of Cards and Orange is the New Black and feature films like Mitt.141 And, of course, YouTube and Vimeo provide
internet-based platforms for user-generated video content. Cable
programmers like HBO, too, are now getting in the game, promising
to deliver their premium content to online streamers who do not subscribe to cable.142
Online streaming of broadcast programming poses one of the
biggest threats to the traditional political economy of video production and distribution. It is no wonder that Nielsen, the audience

136. See generally Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 4401, 4406–09 (2009) (discussing Slingbox
and other technological innovations).
137. NIELSEN COMPANY & THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH EXCELLENCE, OUT OF HOME
TELEVISION AND OTHER VIDEO VIEWING BEHAVIORS OF U.S. ADULTS: RESULTS FROM THE
COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH EXCELLENCE VIDEO CONSUMER MAPPING STUDY (2010).
138. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL
255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (finding for broadcasters in suit challenging web-based transmission of U.S. over-the-air programs to viewers in the United States via a Canadian website).
139. Alex Kantrowitz, Are Advertisers Spending Too Much on Online Video?, ADVERTISING
AGE
(Sept.
11,
2013),
http://adage.com/article/digital/nielsen-online-videoconsumption-tiny-compared-tv/244084/.
140. Associated Press, Cord Cutting a Trend? Nielsen to Begin Counting Online Streaming,
CBS NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cord-cutting-a-trend-nielsento-begin-counting-online-streaming/.
141. Cf. Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (“[C]able regulations adopted in the era of Cheers and The Cosby Show are illsuited to a marketplace populated by Homeland and House of Cards.”).
142. Issie Lapowsky, Down with Cable! Why HBO Is Finally Launching a Standalone Streaming Service, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/hbo-streamingservice/?mbid=social_twitter.
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measurement firm, now includes mobile devices in its analysis of TV
audiences.143 News, moreover, that Comcast, the cable television giant, entered a special “peering” arrangement with Netflix earlier this
year to manage the latter’s high bandwidth traffic to users portends
quite a fundamental restructuring of the video distribution market.144
Broadcasters today are eager to find, and jealously guard, viewers
where they can. And they are invoking all of the legal protections
available to them to ward off emergent networked communications
companies.145
What are courts to do now that the traditional model for distributing premium video is being inverted by a technology that enables
individual users to control where, when, and on what device they
watch content? The courts to which the question was posed in the
cases involving Aereo and FilmOn were divided about the scope of
the public performance right and its application to these new forms
of video distribution—that is, until the Supreme Court decided the
matter this past summer. Their uncertainty was no surprise. On the
one hand, the language in the Transmit Clause recognizes that
transmissions that are delivered to different places at different times
could still be performed publicly within the meaning of the statute.
But the law was also conceived at a time when video distribution was
mostly comprised of simultaneous transmissions of live and episodic
network programs. They were public in the colloquial sense; broadcast television articulated shared cultural and political priorities that
were experienced contemporaneously by all viewers. Today, online
video subscribers trigger the “performance” of broadcast programs
143. Todd Spangler, Nielsen to Add Mobile Device Viewing to TV Ratings in Fall 2014,
VARIETY (Sept. 19, 2013), http://variety.com/2013/tv/news/nielsen-to-add-mobile-deviceviewing-to-tv-ratings-in-fall-2014-1200649185/.
144. Steven Musil, Netflix Reaches Streaming Traffic Agreement with Comcast, CNET (Feb.
23, 2014), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57619353-93/netflix-reaches-streamingtraffic-agreement-with-comcast/. This announcement came on the heels of other news
that, pending regulatory approval, Comcast, the largest cable operator in the country, will
acquire Time Warner Cable, the second largest cable operator in the country. Michael
Santoli, Comcast and Time Warner Cable Merger: What It Means for Consumers, YAHOO! FINANCE
(Feb. 13, 2014), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/comcast-to-acquire-timewarner-cable-143000745.html.
145. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL
255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (holding for broadcast content owners in dispute concerning the
public performance of copyrighted programming framed with advertisements obtained by
defendants from Toronto to computer users in the United States); see also WPIX, Inc. v. ivi,
Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that an internet-based video streaming site is
not a “cable system” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 111, the compulsory licensing provisions of the Copyright Act). I use the term “emergent” or “novel” networked communications throughout to denote the category of technologies that, while extant and available
to users, have not yet been the subject of legal analysis or interpretation by courts.
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with a click or tap of their networked device. In light of the great variety of video programming now available, it makes little sense to refer
to the public in the same sense as broadcast law posits, at least because “performances” are experienced in a far more fractured and
diffuse way than they were just a generation ago.
B. Agencies and the Public Law of Video Distribution Today
The Copyright Act and the Transmit Clause memorialized a
hard-fought, decades-long legislative settlement concerning powerful
interests in the market for video distribution. Congress enacted the
public performance right under Section 106 and the corollary compulsory licensing regime in order to settle the conflict between
broadcasters and cable operators. In the four decades since, Congress has incrementally reformed this regime to account for new video distribution technologies as they have emerged.146
But the Copyright Act does not comprehensively cover the field.
Congress also has amended the Communications Act consistently
since its enactment in 1934 to define the legal obligations and entitlements of the variety of extant stakeholders in the field of broadcast
and video distribution. Congress, for example, substantially revised
the law governing the retransmission of broadcast programming in
1992 in two ways. First, Congress required cable and direct broadcast
satellite service (“DBS”) providers to carry certain broadcast programming. Second, Congress created for broadcasters a new statutory
right to veto cable operators’ unauthorized retransmission of broadcast content.147 These two provisions—must-carry and retransmission
consent—were to work in tandem to improve broadcasters’ market
position vis-à-vis cable operators. These changes to the Communications Act adopted the approach that the FCC had employed for decades before. Congress, moreover, was explicitly mindful that these reforms to the Communications Act would interact with the public
performance right and the compulsory license regime in the Copyright Act.148

146. See, e.g., Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (Title I of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999), 47 U.S.C. §§ 335–338
(2012).
147. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460; see iCraveTV, 2000 WL 255989 (holding for
broadcast content owners in dispute concerning the public performance of copyrighted
programming framed with advertisements obtained by defendants from Toronto to computer users in the United States).
148. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 338(a)(1) (explicitly referring to 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2012)).
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In this vein, the 1992 Communications Act amendments fill out a
legislative field of which the public performance right is just one very
small piece. I show here that the combined history of the public performance right, the compulsory licensing regime, must-carry regulation, retransmission consent, as well as program access paints the picture of a legal field that is determined above all by legislation and
regulation rather than judge-made law. At every critical juncture in
the evolution of the market for video distribution, Congress, the Copyright Office, and the FCC have been the decisive policymaking bodies, filling in gaps and ambiguities of the governing statutes when
novel technologies emerge and the general market circumstances
change over time. This Part sets up my argument in Part III that
courts are misguided when they take it upon themselves to elaborate
any single feature of this regime with barely a whisper about this regulatory context.
1. The Copyright Act
a. Public Performance and the Statutory License
Before 1976, cable operators did not seek the permission of local
stations to retransmit broadcast programming. Broadcasters were
perfectly content with this arrangement. They did not really see cable
service as a threat. To the contrary, they believed that cable operators
could, at best, marginally expand viewership.149 They understood cable television to be more charity than market disruption.
At least in its early years, it arguably was. The cooperatives and
early operators of what was then called “community antenna television” retransmitted broadcast signals to members and potential viewers who, for a variety of reasons, could not otherwise receive clear signals.150 Their main objective was not to compete with broadcasters.
They used large antennas as well as signaling and amplification technologies to receive over-the-air broadcast signals that they would otherwise not be able to get.151 Operatives retransmitted those signals by
cable (or microwave) to interested neighbors’ televisions.152
149. See ROBERT W. CRANDALL & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION
COMPETITION 2 (1996). During this period, moreover, the FCC chose not to regulate
cable retransmission. See Inquiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV
Translators, TV “Satellite” Stations, and TV “Repeaters” on the Orderly Development of
Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403, 431 (1959) (“[W]e find no present basis for asserting jurisdiction or authority over CATV’s . . . .”).
150. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 391–92 (1968).
151. See generally Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 827 (2012).
152. Id.
OR
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It was only as cable service became more popular in the 1960s
that broadcasters grew concerned.153 Under the advertising-based
network-affiliate model of broadcast programming distribution, local
stations paid for network content on the condition that they would be
the exclusive purveyors of the content in that given local market.154
Local stations could count on monetizing local advertisers’ interest in
reaching local audiences. While they welcomed national advertising,
each station cultivated an exclusive relationship with a major broadcast network in order to attract local advertisers.155 Since local advertisers had no real interest in reaching distant markets, a station’s decision to enter into an exclusive agreement with a major network was a
simple exercise in arithmetic.
Cable television unsettled this arrangement. A local cable operator reduced broadcasters’ ability to measure the size of their respective local audience for their programming.156 This was a clear threat
for a business model that depended as heavily as it did (and still does)
on the ability to measure and collect data about audiences.
By the sixties, cable television matured into a line of business for
which viewers were showing a willingness to pay a fee. By the 1970s,
cable operators also began to develop their own programs and, as a
result, disrupted the whole political economy of broadcast distribution.157
Broadcasters in particular grew concerned that cable operators
were monetizing their original programming without permission or
compensation. They accordingly brought suits against cable operators, alleging that they were, among other things, infringing on their
exclusive right to “perform” dramatic works publicly for profit under
the 1909 Copyright Act.158
The Supreme Court rejected broadcasters’ claims in two opinions by Justice Potter Stewart. In Fortnightly v. United Artists159 in 1968
and Teleprompter v. Columbia Broadcasting System160 in 1974, the Court
held that community access television did not infringe on broadcast153. See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d. 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
154. ERIK BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES 1933–1953 (1968).
155. Id.
156. MARY ALICE & MAYER PHILLIPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA
TELEVISION 42 (1972); MARTIN H. SEIDEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY
ANTENNA TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY 44 (1965).
157. See Sylvain, supra note 151 at 827–28.
158. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968).
159. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
160. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
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ers’ public performance rights under the 1909 Copyright Act.161 Retransmission by cable, the Court concluded in Fortnightly, was not a
public performance within the meaning of the 1909 law because “the
basic function” of the amplification technologies at issue is not unlike
anything that the ordinary broadcast television viewer can do to receive a signal on her own.162 CATV cooperatives and commercial operators in this sense are “passive beneficiar[ies]” of broadcasters’ performances; they are not the purveyors of programming as such.163
The Court in Teleprompter applied this holding to cable operators
that imported distant (that is, not local) broadcast signals into local
markets, interconnected with other area CATV systems, originated
their own video content, and sold advertising.164 Those operators, it
explained, also do not perform within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act.165 First, the Court reasoned, it made no difference under
the 1909 Act that cable operators had become entrepreneurial if
there was still no “nexus” between these new features and the broadcast content that they retransmitted.166 Second, the Court rejected
the argument that cable operators transformed into performers within the meaning of the 1909 law when they began importing distant
signals into local areas that would otherwise not receive them. This
importation function, the Court explained, does not change the nature of cable service because, as in systems that retransmit local signals
to local audiences, it remains a wholly “viewer function.”167 Broadcasters, it explained, send their programs out to the public to be received and watched. Cable operators simply make that content available to viewers.168 The Court was also not particularly taken by the
argument that cable television upsets the political economy of the advertising-based system of broadcasting. Cable operators, Justice Stewart observed, only expand broadcasters’ potential viewer market, and
only really affect their relationship with advertisers.169
Having failed in the courts, broadcasters appealed to Congress.170
There, they found a more hospitable forum. This is not to say that
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400–02; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 405.
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399.
Id. at 398–99.
Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408.
Id. at 410–12.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 408–09.
Id. at 411–13.
EILEEN R. MEEHAN, WHY TV IS NOT OUR FAULT: TELEVISION PROGRAMMING,
VIEWERS, AND WHO’S REALLY IN CONTROL 45 (2005) (“[V]arious pay-television schemes in
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Congress obliged their every request; it did not. Rather, the legislative process, more than litigation, was far more conducive to resolving
the variety of policy concerns—concerns involving competition, the
distribution of free programming, and the protection of local broadcasters.
Legislators, moreover, were already inclined to reform the existing copyright law. Indeed, by the 1950s, legislators already were considering ways to update the 1909 Act.171 By the 1960s, many of the reforms that would appear in the 1976 statute had already been
“hammered out.”172 Indeed, as early as 1966, members of the House
were circulating a version of a provision that resembles the enacted
provision we now call the Transmit Clause.173 The report that accompanied the provision at this early stage observed, moreover, that the
provision was addressed to transmissions that are “capable of reaching
different recipients at different times, as in the case of sounds or images stored in an information system and capable of being performed
or displayed at the initiative of individual members of the public.”174
The report made this observation to explain the last clauses of the
Transmit Clause addressed to time and place.175
The steady emergence of cable television and the Fortnightly and
Teleprompter litigation complicated this legislative work. In those cases,
the Court gave cable operators more leverage than they had before
the opinions were announced. This is what the 1976 Act sought to resolve. As I explained above, in the Transmit Clause, Congress explicitly overturned the holdings in these Supreme Court cases.176

the 1960s led the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and networks to lobby Congress, the FCC, and the public to protect ‘free television’ from cable’s potential threat.”).
171. See Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute
in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 31 (2011) (“Congress set out to update
the 1909 Copyright Act at various points during the first half of the twentieth century
without success.”).
172. Id. at 32.
173. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 57–58 (1966) (defining “transmit” and “public”
under proposed Copyright Act revisions), with 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012) (defining “publicly” in the Transmit Clause).
174. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 58.
175. Id. The congressional report’s description appears to describe the Aereo design.
See supra Part I.A. But, to be clear, it does not address individuated recording applications
like Aereo’s or FilmOn’s. At most, the report raises questions about the Second Circuit’s
analysis of the Transmit Clause in the Cablevision case, where the defendant cable operator
stored broadcast content in its single “information system” and retransmitted those signals
“at the initiative of individual members of the public.” Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 135 (2d
Cir. 2008) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 90-83 at 29 (1967)).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 94–98.
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Importantly, Congress also set out a compulsory licensing scheme
through which “cable systems” would have to pay a statutorily defined
fee under Section 111.177 That provision provides that:
secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system of a
performance or display of a work embodied in a primary
transmission made by a broadcast station licensed by the
Federal Communications Commission . . . shall be subject to
statutory licensing upon compliance with the requirements
of subsection (d) where the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary transmission is permissible under the
rules, regulations, or authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission.178
Section 111 defines a cable system in pertinent part as “a facility” that
“receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more
television broadcast stations licensed by the [FCC], and makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, or other communications channels to subscribing members
of the public who pay for such service.”179 This legislative arrangement allowed cable operators to continue to retransmit without having to concern themselves with the “transaction costs associated with
marketplace negotiations for the carriage of copyrighted programs.”180 Under this scheme, however, cable operators would have
to pay broadcasters in order to retransmit their programming to cable
subscribers.181
Congress settled on these terms with the specific political economy of cable retransmission of broadcasting programming in mind.
There was nothing inevitable or objectively optimal about the balance
that it struck. The impetus for legislative intervention was simply that
cable service had become a viable player in the broadcast television

177. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (defining public performance: to wit, “to transmit or otherwise
communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance
or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times”); Id. § 111 (creating compulsory licensing regime for retransmission of
broadcast programming by a cable system).
178. Id. § 111(c)(1).
179. Id. § 111(f)(3).
180. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 3.
181. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d). Some broadcasters today would like to see the compulsory
licensing regime discontinued. See JOHN BERGMAYER, THE CABLE AND SATELLITE
COMPULSORY
COPYRIGHT
LICENSES
1,
4
(2011),
http://siliconflatirons.com/documents/publications/report/CompulsoryCopyrightLicens
es.pdf.
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market. Congress set out “[l]imitations on exclusive rights” to retransmit “broadcast programming by cable.”182
One can go further and conclude, as the Second Circuit did in
Aereo, that when Congress drafted the Transmit Clause, it did not intend to confer a sweeping protection to content creators for all time.
Rather, legislators redressed the controversy known to them at the
time, explicitly settling on “a series of detailed and complex provisions which attempt to resolve the question of the copyright liability
of cable television systems.”183 There was “no simple answer to the cable-copyright controversy,” the House Report on the bill explained.184
Congress was simply doing the best it could to find a balanced approach to the existing market for video programming. In this way,
Congress moderated the specific extant interests. Had it sought to
account for any possible iteration of video distribution, it could have
said so.185
b. The Copyright Office
But Congress did more than define the relative entitlements and
duties of broadcasters and cable operators. Under Section 111, it also
delegated to the Copyright Office the responsibility of administering
the licensing regime and,186 as I show here, refining the balance of interests as communications technologies change and new technologies
emerge.
The statute prescribes the conditions under which cable providers may obtain a compulsory license to retransmit copyright works.
The agency’s role is, on the one hand, quite mundane: it must elaborate the form and content of filings by providers for the purposes of
administering compulsory licensing filings and facilitating payments.187 This authority is not unlike the role the agency plays in the
administration of licensing for the distribution of phonorecords of
nondramatic musical works as well as the distribution of digital audio
under Section 114.188

182. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (describing title of section).
183. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678.
184. Id.
185. Compare id., with Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101(5), 72
Stat. 731, 737 (defining “aircraft” broadly to include “any contrivance now known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for navigation of or flight in the air”) (emphasis added).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d).
187. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.17 (2000).
188. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2 )& (f).
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The agency’s authority, however, extends far beyond the simple
ministerial implementation of licensing regimes. Consider the Register of Copyright’s responsibility to advise Congress and agencies during the consideration of amendments or in light of new developments
in the market.189 In this capacity, the agency has been integral to
Congress’s enactment of copyright-related legislation for decades, including the period before the 1976 Act and before passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998 (“DMCA”).190 Courts, moreover, are required to seek out the expertise of the Copyright Office in
cases in which the accuracy of information in a copyright registration
statement is contested.191
The Copyright Office also plays the important role of defining
positive entitlements and duties as changes in communications technologies render the statutory language more ambiguous over time.
They take such action through interpretive and legislative rulemakings. And courts routinely defer to the agency’s interpretation of
provisions of the Copyright Act at times of dramatic technological
change.192 They have reasoned that Congress intended the Copyright
Office to be the “administrative overseer” of the licensing regime under Section 111 in particular because of the characteristic dynamism
of the market for communications technologies at issue in that statute.193 No other entity in the federal government is more equipped to
measure disruptive communication technologies against the terms of
the Copyright Act than the Copyright Office.
Importantly, courts, too, have recognized as much. In 2012, a
year before it issued its opinion in the Aereo case, the Second Circuit
heard an appeal in which ivi, a company that provided web-based video streaming to users, sought a declaratory judgment that it is a “cable

189. See id. § 701(b)(1)–(2).
190. See, e.g., 144 Cong. REC. 24468 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Patrick Leahy
referring to the “recommendations and hard work of the Copyright Office” in developing
the DMCA).
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2) (“In any case in which inaccurate information . . . is alleged, the court shall request the Register of Copyrights to advise the court whether the
inaccurate information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse
registration.”).
192. See Cablevision v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 609 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (citing DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1956)).
193. Id. at 608; cf. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 771–72 (E.D. Pa.
2001) (deferring to the Copyright Office’s interpretation of exemption under Section 114
pursuant to Chevron; explaining that “the Copyright Office could not exercise its duties
and functions without the ability to interpret” the applicable statutory language in the context of new and evolving technologies). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
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system” within the meaning of Section 111.194 With that designation,
ivi would be entitled to retransmit broadcast signals as long as it pays
the statutory fee for the benefit.195 The Second Circuit rejected the
claim, agreeing with broadcasters that the compulsory licensing provision under Section 111 does not “extend to Internet transmissions.”196
The panel also turned to the Copyright Office’s conclusions on
the matter to get a better sense of “Congress’s intent.”197 It did so
even though the agency was not a party to the litigation. Rather, the
Copyright Office had published reports to Congress in which it repeatedly concluded that Internet transmissions do not count as a “cable system” within the meaning of the compulsory licensing regime
under Section 111.198 Indeed, in reports and testimony to Congress
from late 1997 to 2011, the agency had determined consistently that
internet streaming is not sufficiently like cable television service to be
subject to the compulsory licensing provision.199 Citing Chevron, the
Second Circuit deferred to the Copyright Office’s assessment.200 The
agency’s conclusion, the panel held, was reasonable and not otherwise barred by the statute.201 I will return to this case in Part III below.
2. The Communications Act
The Copyright Act is not the only statute through which Congress legislates in the field of video distribution. When it amended
the Communications Act in 1992, Congress set out an even more
elaborate regime. Among other things, through that statute, Congress has tasked the FCC with administering a system for awarding licenses to broadcasters and rules that govern the markets for video distribution and programming.
With this authority, the FCC has had a major, if not decisive, role
in making legal sense of novel video distribution technologies that
were not known to lawmakers in 1934, when Congress first enacted
the statute. For example, as cable television emerged in valley towns
across the country in the late 1940s and 1950s,202 the agency relied on
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 277–79 (2d Cir. 2012).
See id. at 278–79.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 283 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 188; U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, SATELLITE TELEVISION EXTENSION AND LOCALISM ACT § 302 REPORT 48 (2011)).
199. Id. (citing, inter alia, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT
LICENSING REGIMES COVERING RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS 97 (1997)).
200. Id. at 284–85.
201. Id. at 284.
202. Sylvain, supra note 151, at 827.
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the Communications Act to bar cable providers from importing distant broadcast signals into local markets.203 Congress ratified the
FCC’s general regulatory approach in 1992 amendments to the
Communications Act.204 It did so fully mindful of the public performance right and the statutory licensing regime in the Copyright Act;
it observed that the new provisions modify neither “the compulsory
copyright license established in section 111” nor “existing or future
video programming licensing agreements between broadcasting stations and video programmers.”205 The 1992 statutory amendments reformed the 1976 Act specifically to redress the remarkable shift in
market definition caused by the real explosion of cable television in
the 1980s.
Today, the Communications Act and the FCC’s implementation
of it embody the greater part of video distribution law. The FCC,
however, has yet to speak definitively about how provisions of the
Communications Act apply to internet-based video distribution in the
way the Copyright Office has.206 In this subpart, however, I detail the
steps the FCC has taken in this regard to underscore the extensive
scope of existing public law in this area. I argue that courts should
routinely incorporate, or at least acknowledge in their analyses of the
current generation of video streaming cases, this expansive regulatory
arrangement.
a. Retransmission Consent and Must-Carry
From the late-1940s to the mid-1960s, the FCC chose to impose a
regulatory light touch on the new cable operator upstarts that were
emerging across the country. The common view then was that “community antenna television,” as it was called, supplemented broadcasting by relaying signals to low-lying valley communities.207 It did not
matter that the new video distribution technology complicated the
network-affiliate broadcast model of video distribution. The presumption (now, understood as a conceit) was that broadcasting could
never really be displaced by the upstarts. Broadcasters in this early

203. Id. at 829.
204. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1) (2012) (“No cable system or other multichannel video programming distributor shall retransmit the signal of a broadcasting station . . . .”).
205. Id. § 325(b)(6); see also 17 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2012) (“[T]he secondary transmission
to the public of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission is
actionable as an act of infringement.”).
206. See supra notes 186–201 and accompanying text.
207. See Sylvain, supra note 151, at 827.
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period did not have any doubt about their importance as public trustees of the airwaves.
By the mid-1960s, however, as cable service spread, the common
wisdom changed. Cable was clearly becoming more than a supplement to broadcasting; it had become a gatekeeper to many local markets and a potential competitor on video programming itself. It was
displacing the centrality of broadcasting.
The FCC responded by promulgating rules that required cable
operators to obtain the agreement of local stations to carry signals to
subscribers in the local market.208 The agency also imposed pricing
regulations on cable operators on the theory that they could abuse
their new gatekeeping position in local markets by charging subscribers unreasonably high rates.209 Cable companies of course resisted
these changes on the grounds that the FCC did not have the statutory
authority to regulate them—that they were not broadcasters within
the meaning of the Communications Act.210 The agency had argued
that it could regulate cable service because it is ancillary to a service it
otherwise has the authority to regulate—broadcasting.211 The Supreme Court affirmed the agency’s interpretation.212
In 1984, a little more than a decade and a half later, Congress
lifted these FCC regulations in local areas where there was “effective
competition.” The FCC subsequently defined this term broadly, allowing cable providers to operate in most local markets free from
price regulation. The consequence of the 1984 amendment and its
implementation by the FCC was a decade of high subscriber rates for
cable service.213

208. See, e.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 ¶ 17 (1962)
(denying transmitter permit application); Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay TV Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., No. 14895, Grant of Authorizations in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations Used to Relay TV Broad. Signals to Cmty. Antenna TV Sys., No. 15233, 2 F.C.C.2d
725, 796–97 (1966) (adopting rules and regulations). See generally LELAND JOHNSON,
TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVISION (1994); Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. §
325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 102 (1996).
209. See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
210. See id. at 172.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 181.
213. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, § 2(a)(1), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (“Since rate deregulation, monthly rates for
the lowest priced basic cable service have increased by 40 percent or more for 28 percent
of cable television subscribers. . . . The average monthly cable rate has increased almost 3
times as much as the Consumer Price Index since rate deregulation.”).
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By the early 1990s, as consumer worries about the rate of increase
in cable prices intensified, broadcasters and consumer groups agitated for more protective legislation. They set their sights on an
amendment to the Communications Act that would effectively enlarge broadcasters’ leverage vis-à-vis cable operators and other “multichannel video programming distributors” (“MVPDs”).214 The common view was that cable providers, who, unlike broadcasters, had no
positive responsibility to attend to the public interest, were drowning
out free, over-the-air programming.215
This push for reform succeeded. Legislators came to believe
that, in spite of the 1976 compromise, broadcasters were airing content with disproportionately little benefit in return.216 Cable operators now controlled access to local markets and reaped all of the advantages of the content that broadcasters were supplying. This,
according to the Senate Committee Report on the bill that eventually
became the new law, unsettled the very foundation of over-the-air
broadcasting.217 Free video programming, the Report explained,
should never be “replaced by a system which requires consumers to
pay for television service.”218 The new law would give broadcasters a
new entitlement that they could use as leverage in negotiations with
MVPDs over retransmission terms. Among other things, for example,
broadcasters and other content providers could negotiate to add new
channels that providers would otherwise not carry.219
Among other things, the Cable Television Consumer and Competition Act of 1992 requires cable operators to carry local broadcasters’ signals to local audiences if the local station elects to forgo nego-

214. Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 305, 336-37 (1993).
215. Id. at 335.
216. S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 35 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168 (observing that “the Committee . . . does not believe that public policy supports a system under which broadcasters in effect subsidize the establishment of their chief competitors.”);
see also Federal Communications Commission, Implementation of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 8 FCC Rcd. 2965, 3004–05 (1993) (determining that the 1992 Cable Act “created a new communications right in the broadcaster’s signal, completely separate from the programming contained in the signal.” (emphasis
added)).
217. S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 29, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168.
218. Id. at 30, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1169.
219. Id. at 29, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1168–69; see also 138 CONG. REC. S64201 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Daniel Inouye) (“S. 12 permits the two interested parties—the station and the cable system—to negotiate concerning their mutual
interests. It is of course in their mutual interests that these parties reach an agreement.”).
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tiating on retransmission consent terms.220 Under the new law, moreover, cable operators cannot receive compensation for carrying local
broadcast signals when a local broadcaster elects to be a must-carry
station.221 If, however, a broadcaster elects to proceed under the retransmission consent regime, cable television providers must settle on
retransmission terms with broadcasters. In the absence of an agreement, the prior may not retransmit the latter’s signal. Indeed, they
must remove that broadcaster’s signal from their offerings and,
moreover, may not import the distant signal of another affiliate within
the same network.
Crucially, this must-carry requirement rests on the popular faith
(and, now, fiction) that “television broadcasting plays a vital role in
serving the public interest.”222 The Supreme Court later ratified this
view when, in response to a First Amendment challenge by cable operators, it held that the must-carry provisions are content-neutral and
justified by a legitimate government interest in providing free, overthe-air public interest programming to consumers.223 Congress, the
Court explained, decided that pay television could never displace this
model.
Of course, in today’s market, this account about free, over-the-air
broadcasting is more romance than reality, as fewer people every year
rely on television antennas to watch broadcast programs.224 Most

220. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act § 6; 47 U.S.C.
§ 325(b)(1)(B) (2012) (retransmission consent provision which also creates exception for
must-carry provision at 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2012)). The must-carry provisions essentially
require cable service providers to carry a minimum number of broadcast signals based on
the relative size of the local market. 47 U.S.C. § 534(a).
221. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(10). There are a variety of reasons that would compel a broadcaster to elect must-carry over retransmission consent. See generally CHARLES B. GOLDFARB,
RETRANSMISSION CONSENT AND OTHER FEDERAL RULES AFFECTING PROGRAMMERDISTRIBUTOR NEGOTIATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REPORT RL34078(2007), available at http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileakscrs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RL34078.pdf.
222. S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 30 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1174.
223. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224 (1997).
224. See Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 76
Fed. Reg. 17071, 17072 (proposed Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76)
(“Since Congress enacted the retransmission consent regime in 1992, there have been significant changes in the video programming marketplace.”). But see Emily Steel, After Supreme Court Ruling, Aereo’s Rivals in TV Streaming Seize Opening, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/business/media/after-supreme-court-rulingaereos-rivals-in-tv-streaming-seize-opening.html.
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viewers subscribe to cable or use their internet connection to watch
programming at a time and place that is convenient.225
In any event, Congress found broadcasting important enough to
renew the retransmission consent and must-carry provisions in 1999
and expanded them to cover direct broadcast satellite providers.226
The result is that, today, broadcasters are assured that cable operators
and satellite providers will carry their signal. In this regard, the 1992
Act has done precisely what its proponents hoped; it has given broadcasters more leverage in their negotiations with MVPDs.
These new entitlements, however, have introduced an important
new wrinkle in the political economy of video distribution. Ever since
1992, broadcasters and other video content producers have routinely
held-up popular time-sensitive programming (like major professional
sports events) when it comes time to negotiate new retransmission
terms.227 They do so to extract additional commitments from operators, including the promise to carry new or unpopular channels or to
pay more per-subscriber fees for the channels they do carry.228
Recognizing this moral hazard, in 1999 amendments to the
Communications Act, Congress required the FCC to ensure that
broadcasters negotiate with cable and satellite providers in good
faith.229 Congress later imposed the “good faith” obligation on the
cable operators and broadcasters a few years later. The agency has yet
to use this authority, however, to protect subscribers from the game of
chicken that broadcasters play with cable operators whenever retransmission terms are up for renewal. Congress is considering an array of reforms in light of the lack of action from the FCC on the
“good faith” provision. The Video CHOICE (Consumers Have Options in Choosing Entertainment) Act, for example, would put an end
225. Cf. Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (“[C]able regulations adopted in the era of Cheers and The Cosby Show are illsuited to a marketplace populated by Homeland and House of Cards.”).
226. See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(5)(A) (2012) (defining the term “provider of direct broadcast satellite service”); id. §§ 338, 614 (2012); see also Satellite Home Viewer Improvement
Act of 1999 (Title I of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform
Act of 1999), Pub. L. No. 106-113, Appendix I, § 1009(a), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-537–38.
227. See, e.g., Ted Johnson, DirecTV Refuses to ‘Bail Out’ Time Warner Cable in Dodgers
Standoff, VARIETY (July 29, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/tv/news/dodgers-tv-standofftime-warner-cable-says-yes-to-arbitration-but-directv-doesnt-bite-1201270994/; Chloe Albanesius, Cablevision Sues Viacom Over Channel Bundling, PC MAGAZINE (Feb. 26, 2013),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2415967,00.asp.
228. See, e.g., Albanesius, supra note 227; David Wharton, PGA Championship faces CBS
blackout for Time Warner Cable customers, LA TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-pga-championship-cbs-televisionblackout-20130807,0,7602876.story#axzz2bNyTEHFj.
229. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C)(ii).
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to broadcast networks’ blackouts during contract negotiations over
retransmission terms.230 This proposed bill would also forbid broadcasters from leveraging their popular networks to force cable operators to carry affiliated but less popular cable networks.231
b. Program Access
Must-carry and retransmission consent represented significant reforms to video distribution law. Like the public performance right
and the statutory license, however, they comprise only a fraction of
the whole public law in the legislative field of video distribution.
Congress in 1992 also amended the Communications Act to prohibit
MVPDs from “engag[ing] in unfair methods of competition or unfair
or deceptive acts or practices.”232 The statute further requires the
FCC to implement program access regulations that elaborate on this
restriction.233
Of course, as the statute was drafted in the early 1990s, it is not
clear whether Congress meant to include online video distributors
within the scope of the statute. The statute defines an MVPD as:
a person such as, but not limited to, a cable operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast
satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite program
distributor, who makes available for purchase, by subscribers
or customers, multiple channels of video programming.234
While the list in the definition is helpful, it is only illustrative; it is not
exhaustive of covered providers. It therefore leaves the legal obligations owed by and to the variety of emergent online video providers
today in legal limbo, at least for now.
The difficulty in the statute is in its reference to “channels.” The
question is whether online video providers supply “multiple channels
230. H.R. 3719, 113th Cong. (2013); cf. Joe Flint, Proposed Bills Seek to Rewrite Media Rulebook,
L.A.
TIMES
(Dec.
12,
2013),
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-proposed-bills-mediarules-20131212,0,2826769.story#axzz2nIXEN9ut.
231. Another bill, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, would reform retransmission consent and compulsory licensing rules. H.R. 3720, 113th Cong. (2013). Cf.
Alex Ben Block, “Two Bills Introduced in Congress to Stem TV Blackouts,” HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/two-billsintroduced-congress-stem-665429.
232. 47 U.S.C. § 548(b).
233. Id. § 548(c). See generally 47 C.F.R. § 76 (1998), (FCC rules governing competitive
access to cable programming).
234. 47 U.S.C. § 522; see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.1000(e) (defining MVPD as “an entity engaged in the business of making available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video programming”).
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of video programming” in the same way that cable providers do within
the meaning of the Communications Act?235 The FCC has had the
occasion to answer the question in the context of a dispute arising out
of a video programmer’s decision to prematurely terminate its licensing arrangement with Sky Angel, an operator of a subscription service
that distributes the content of television networks in real time to televisions equipped with internet-connected set-top boxes.236 The agency has tentatively rejected Sky Angel’s complaint about the termination, explaining that, based on the evidence before it, “Sky Angel does
not provide its subscribers with a transmission path,” as the agency has
interpreted the word.237 But the agency’s conclusion, again, was tentative; it was only replying to Sky Angel’s request for a “temporary
standstill” of the arrangement between it and Discovery, the content
provider involved in the dispute. The FCC has yet to enter a final order in the case.
This is no surprise. The language of the statute is not clear. Nor,
as in Aereo, is it clear what the correct answer ought to be as a matter
of law. Indeed, since the dispute raises novel questions about a disruptive technology that the pertinent statute and regulations could
not anticipate, the FCC in 2012 opened a proceeding in which it invited public comment on the scope of the program access rules.238
That proceeding and the adjudication that instigated it remain open
today, to the frustration of Sky Angel, which recently had to suspend
its video distribution services.239 There is little question that there are
substantial competition concerns at stake.240 But, again, it is not at all
235. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13). Most notable among the newest generation of upstarts is
Sky Angel, an operator of a subscription service that distributes the content of television
networks in real time to televisions equipped with internet-connected set-top boxes. The
company enters into contracts with broadcasters and other video content producers like
Discovery and Disney, for example, to supply content to its subscribers who, in turn, can
watch the programming on their television as it hits the airwaves. In this way, Sky Angel
provides a service that is similar to that of traditional cable operators. The significant difference is that, even while their subscribers watch the programs on high-definition televisions, Sky Angel transmits the programming to subscribers over the Internet.
236. Sky Angel U.S., LLC, 25 FCC Rcd. 3879, 3880 ¶ 4, 3883 ¶ 7 (2010) (emergency
petition for temporary standstill). The video programmer involved in the dispute, Discovery Holding Company, qualifies as a competitor MVPD because its owner has a significant
stake in such companies. See News Corp., 23 FCC Rcd. 3265, 3273 ¶ 12 (2008) (noting the
stakes of Discovery’s officers and directors in a competing MVPD, Liberty Media Corporation).
237. Sky Angel, 25 FCC Rcd. at 3883 ¶ 7.
238. Media Bureau, 27 FCC Rcd. 3079, 3082 ¶ 6 (Mar. 30, 2012) (notice).
239. See Supplemental Comments of Sky Angel U.S., LLC, Nos. 12-80 & 12-83, (F.C.C.
June 10, 2014), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7521313509.
240. Consider that Sky Angel has brought antitrust claims against other video programmers who have also prematurely terminated their arrangements with the online video
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evident in the language of the statute or pertinent regulations how
these disputes ought to be resolved as a matter of existing law. All
eyes now are on the FCC to resolve the question.
All of this work deserves far more consideration than courts were
willing to give it in the public performance cases. It is one thing to
ask courts to be more respectful, and another to determine how they
should implement that deference as a matter of course. I take up that
challenge in Part III below.
III. DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE
As I show above, in Part II, the task of determining whether unlicensed online video streaming of free, over-the-air broadcast programming infringes on broadcasters’ public performance rights is
complicated. It cannot be done well simply by examining the plain
text or specific legislative history of the Transmit Clause. The pertinent statutes are like pieces of a 1,000-piece jigsaw puzzle. Each piece
furthers a specific objective that complements the others.241 Putting
the pieces together, however, requires knowledge of where the others
fit. Congress gave to the Copyright Office and the FCC the assignment of making sense of these various pieces when new technologies
emerge.
In the recent cases involving Aereo and FilmOn, however, federal
judges did not convey anything but unwavering confidence in their
institutional capacity and authority to determine the scope of the
Transmit Clause.242 The courts interpreted the provision, unbothered
by the various provisions and agency interpretations that bear on the
question.
In this Part, I propose that judges be far more mindful of their
institutional authority and capacity than they have been in this setting. Scholars have studied the relative roles that courts, legislators,
and agencies play when reviewing controversies across substantive areas associated with networked information technologies. They have
not, however, directed the same attention to defining the courts’ authority or capacity to resolve disputes as complex and agency-

provider. The D.C. Circuit dismissed Sky Angel’s claim against the National Cable Satellite
Corporation for pulling C-SPAN from its lineup, but only because Sky Angel did not plead
sufficient facts to establish “concerted action,” not because the motivating concerns were
not anticompetitive. See Sky Angel v. Nat’l Cable Satellite Corp., 947 F. Supp. 2d 88, 101–
02 (D.D.C. 2013).
241. See supra Part II.B.
242. See supra Part I.D.
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involving as video distribution. This Part rectifies this silence by drawing on principles in administrative law doctrine.
A. Judicial Deference Generally
There are two basic reasons for deference in judicial interpretation of public law. First, courts consider deferring when they assume
that there is a nontrivial risk that they might make a mistake about the
substantive issue in dispute. Even if their epistemic error can later be
cured, their intervention could be destabilizing in the interim. Accordingly, a court will defer if it also believes that another institution
(that is, a legislature, an agency, or standard-setting organization) has
a greater institutional capacity or expertise to make the right decisions in the given subject matter. Thus, A will elect to abide by B’s
prior conclusion on the same question even though A might have resolved the issue differently in the first instance.243 Implicit in this conception is the recognition that A always has the freedom to decide
whether it should defer to the prior decision by B, but that B is far
likelier to get it right in the first instance.244
The second reason for deference is institutional. Deference in
these cases is an explicit recognition that certain institutions are by design responsible for enacting a limited range of laws or rules in the
first instance. This means A will defer to B because the former is A
and the latter is B.245 It does not matter whether B is, from A’s perspective, right or wrong as a substantive matter.246
Separation of powers and democratic legitimacy are constitutional principles that impose formal limits on judges’ authority to make
legal decisions irrespective of what the best substantive resolution is.247
The concept of separation of powers associates each of the branches
of government with a specific and mutually exclusive role in federal
governance. This structural arrangement reflects the negotiated bal-

243. See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072
(2008).
244. See id. at 1075.
245. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.” (footnote omitted)).
246. See id. at 845.
247. Id. at 842–45.
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ance reached during the founding period as well as a more general
view of how constitutional democracies ought to function.248
Democratic legitimacy, on the other hand, requires constituencies to validate the public laws by which they must abide. Under this
conception, the elected branches are presumed to be superior to
courts at resolving contested policy questions.249 They are accountable to, and representatives of, defined constituencies.250 At least theoretically, elections are the mechanisms through which elected officials
stay in tune with constituents’ interests. Federal courts, on the other
hand, have no such constituencies and, as a result, no obligation to
heed majoritarian demands on substantive outcomes. Independent
agencies are generally sheltered from the vagaries of electoral politics,
but not as removed (or antimajoritarian) as courts are by design.
They, like elected officials, are better able to “set[] the dimensions of
social policy that may involve trades among the interests of broad
groupings of citizens,” while “judges’ strengths lie in resolving discrete
controversies between individuals, in which one wins, another loses,
and broad social adjustments are secondary to the outcome of their
concrete dispute.”251
The doctrine of judicial review of agency action in administrative
law embodies these two background constitutional norms: separation
of powers and democratic legitimacy. The Supreme Court’s opinion
in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council252 stands as the principle
statement on these two norms. Under the Chevron doctrine, judges
defer to agencies’ substantive implementation of ambiguous statutes
on the assumption that the agency officials who have been thinking
longest and most systematically about the given problem are likely to
have the most prudent policy solution.253 To be sure, courts will reject
the agency action when it conflicts with congressional intent.254 But
courts will defer to an agency’s judgment if they find that the agency
action at issue reasonably accommodates competing interests, “the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered
the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision in248. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629–30 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, §§ 143–44,
150, 159 (Simon & Brown 2012) (1690).
249. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
250. Id.
251. Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1257 (1992).
252. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
253. Id. at 865–66.
254. See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634–35 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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volves reconciling conflicting policies.”255 These elements are characteristic of the work that many agencies undertake. It is presumably
for this reason that judicial reversals of agency action under Chevron
are much less frequent than judicial affirmation.256
Public choice critiques have not diminished Congress’s continued delegation to agencies and courts’ concomitant deference to
agency action.257 To the contrary, Congress continues to delegate a
wide range of responsibilities to agencies; agencies, in turn, have developed a variety of regulatory tools to implement legislative priorities.258 Among other things, agency officials collect information about
fields as they change, report on those findings to legislators and other
policymakers, and adapt laws to changing circumstances. Agencies
are generally well-equipped to undertake these responsibilities in
spite of concerns about regulatory capture and self-dealing.259
Courts accordingly honor the various forms through which agencies implement public law by deferring, or at least respecting, the latter’s efforts as a matter of course. That is, courts have not adopted a
one-size-fits-all regime of deference after Chevron. Instead, they tailor
their scrutiny of agency action to each case and legislative field. Under current doctrine, the level of deference courts give to agencies
falls somewhere along a spectrum or “continuum”;260 it depends on
the agency action under scrutiny, the specific statutory authority on
which the agency bases its action, and the relative or unique institutional expertise the agency has brought to bear.261 On one end of this
spectrum, there are cases in which courts ignore, are indifferent to, or
are altogether skeptical about the agency’s interpretations generally.
These are cases where Congress has unambiguously decided not to
confer lawmaking authority to an agency or where courts have traditionally assumed the authority to decide this kind of dispute in the
255. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted).
256. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 696 n.91
(2007).
257. See, e.g., City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013) (holding
that courts must defer under Chevron to an agency’s determination that it has jurisdiction
to interpret an ambiguous statute). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2010).
258. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001) (discussing when Chevron
deference applies).
259. See Barkow, supra note 257.
260. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1089–90 (2008).
261. Id. at 228.
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first instance.262 In these cases, courts apply a “pragmatic, multifactored methodology” that considers “statutory text and the whole
act; legislative history and statutory purpose; the evolution of the statute through judicial and other precedents; and substantive policy
canons.”263 At the other end are cases involving a statute through
which Congress has delegated primary and nearly exclusive lawmaking authority to an agency. In these latter cases, courts assume a far
more deferential posture.264 But the amount of deference a court
gives to an agency can vary widely, from “consultative” to “super deference,” depending on the nature of the authority at issue.265
In the context of video distribution, Congress delegated specific
authority to the Copyright Office and FCC. These agencies are tasked
with implementing the Copyright Act and the Communications Act as
new and unanticipated technologies emerge. Over the years, Congress has given these agencies broad authority to make legal sense of
new technologies in the first instance. I outline those duties here,
based on my account in Part II.
Reporting. Both agencies are explicitly charged with the task of
collecting information from stakeholders about the state of affairs in
video distribution. That is, they collect information about prevalent
market uses, consumer habits, judicial interpretations, and emergent
technologies. They play this role, again, because there is only so
much that Congress can do in this legislative field. In any event,
agencies are far better equipped and staffed to collect such information. But Congress also has charged both agencies with the responsibility of reporting their findings to legislators, other federal
agencies, and, on request, to courts. This role is precisely the sort of
task an agent for Congress should undertake.266
Adapting Current Laws. Both agencies also have the authority to
promulgate rules and offer guidance on substantive questions when
the governing statute is ambiguous or unclear. They do this in ways
that Congress, as a practical matter, simply cannot. Above, in Part II,
I discussed at least two examples that showcase this important feature
262. See infra Part III.B (discussing electronic surveillance).
263. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 260, at 1117.
264. See infra Part III.B (discussing broadband network management).
265. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 260, at 1098–99.
266. While the Copyright Office has the responsibility to report to Congress and the
courts on copyright related matters, it is a subordinate agency within the Library of Congress. See 17 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012). The current Register of Copyrights and her predecessor are on record as advocating the restructuring of the Copyright Office as an independent agency. See Letter of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, to Representative
John Conyers, Jr. (Mar. 23, 2015).
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of their responsibilities administration: first, the FCC’s rulemakings
addressed to cable operators and broadcasters in the 1960s and, second, the Copyright Office’s consistent determination over the course
of the past decade and a half that internet transmissions are not included in the compulsory licensing regime. In both cases, the agencies promulgated a rule or interpretation to fill a legislative gap until
Congress formally amends the old statute or enacts a new one to resolve a substantive ambiguity occasioned by the emergence of a disruptive new video distribution technology like online streaming.
Convening. Hand-in-hand with the responsibility of collecting information is the important role both agencies have in convening discussions and negotiations between the various stakeholders in the
field. Congress has given to the FCC in particular broad authority to
arbitrate or mediate disputes. In this capacity, the FCC is best positioned to understand the relative priorities of service providers, consumer advocacy groups, and technologists. The FCC’s rulemaking
proceedings also operate as opportunities for the various stakeholders
to convene formally. The agency, in turn, relies on the exchange of
ideas to formulate policy that is presumably reflective of the various
rival interests.
Expertise. Finally, over the years, the Copyright Office and the
FCC have developed a uniquely deep understanding of the nature of
communication markets. The FCC in particular has lawyers, economists, and technologists on staff to elucidate new developments and
trends. The Copyright Office, on the other hand, operates as a convener, a research arm for Congress, and an administrator for licensing
regimes across substantive areas. Both agencies have acquired this
deep level of knowledge in ways that exceed anything close to what
Congress or the courts have.
Together, these various activities paint a picture of broad responsibility. Over time, Congress has actively chosen to give the Copyright
Office and the FCC substantial power to make sense of new communications technologies as they emerge. Because Congress has given
the FCC and the Copyright Office these powers, courts have accordingly afforded deference to those agencies on the scope of video distribution law.
B. Judicial Deference and Communication Technologies
Institutional authority and capacity are not the only justifications
for judicial deference. Different substantive areas warrant different
kinds of expertise. In the context of copyright law, courts are reluctant to expand existing copyright protections to novel communication
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technologies “without explicit legislative guidance.”267 The Supreme
Court affirmed this principle in Sony v. Universal City Studios.268 In
Sony, it found that manufacturers of videocassette recorders are not
secondarily liable for viewers’ reproduction of copyright protected
television programs.269 It determined that users generally record
those programs for their personal use (that is, they “time-shift”).270
The Court held that these “substantial noninfringing uses” do not
cause the requisite level of harm to the copyright owners.271
The Sony Court explained that judges are generally less capable
of “accommodat[ing] fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology” than
Congress is.272 It cited the well-established view “that the protection
given to copyrights is wholly statutory.”273 The Court noted that this is
why courts have been reluctant “to expand the protections afforded
by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance.”274
The 1976 Copyright Act itself is evidence of this interaction between courts and Congress. The Sony Court cited Teleprompter and
Fortnightly, both overturned by the Act, as cases that triggered a legislative fix to the statutory public performance right.275 Courts accordingly, the Sony Court noted, must err on the side of caution before
broadening protections. “Sound policy, as well as history,” the Court
explained, “supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted mate-

267. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (citing, inter
alia, Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) and Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968)); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 965 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Sony, 464
U.S. at 431).
268. 464 U.S. 417, 446–47.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 449–50.
271. Id. at 456.
272. Id. at 431.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. (citing, inter alia, Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415 U.S.
394 (1974) and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968)).
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rials.”276 It asserted as much even as the fair use analysis is characteristically fact-intensive and best suited to adjudication.277
But, to be sure, the reasoning in Sony is not what most students of
administrative law generally associate with the idea of deference. As I
outlined above, deference, at least as it comes up in administrative law
doctrine, refers to the posture courts assume when Congress has
charged an agency with interpreting or implementing the statutory
regime at issue in a case. Sony was not about that kind of deference.
The dispute in Sony concerned a question—the scope of the fair use
defense278—that courts have assumed the responsibility of resolving in
the first instance.279 But it was during the course of its fair use analysis
that the Court explicitly second-guessed its own capacity and institutional authority to stretch the law to apply to the new technology at
issue.280 It expressed this reticence as deference to Congress.
That same principle should have applied in the cases involving
Aereo and FilmOn, but it did not. Indeed, after reading Aereo, one
might think that courts need not be so deferential to Congress or
agencies generally when they adjudicate disputes involving novel
communication technologies. In their opinions, neither Justice Breyer nor Justice Scalia for a second considered whether the Court was
the right forum to decide in the first instance whether the Transmit
Clause reaches online video streaming—a technology that was unknown to most people until just a few years ago.281 Their assumption
276. Id.; cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne might claim that courts, when interpreting statutes, should
assume in close cases that a decision with ‘enormous social consequences’ should be made
by democratically elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected agency administrators.” (citation omitted)).
277. See Monge v. Maya Magazines, 688 F.3d 1164, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass 1841)). The fact-specific nature of
the fair use analysis remains a point of great consternation for many courts, scholars, and
practitioners because of how unpredictably and inconsistently it has been applied. See, e.g.,
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam) (noting that
“the issue of fair use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright”); 2 PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.1 (2013); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair
Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106–07 (1990); Mazzone, supra note 9, at 398–403;
David Nimmer, “Fairest of them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 263, 287 (2003); Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 9, at 126–28.
278. Sony, 464 U.S. at 447–51.
279. But see Mazzone, supra note 9, at 414–15.
280. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 (“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent
deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to
accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.”).
281. See supra Part I.D.

766

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:715

was that courts have the authority to and are capable of resolving such
disputes by simply examining no more than the statutory provision in
dispute.
This proposition sounds right for two reasons. First, Congress
has not delegated to any agency the authority to implement the
Transmit Clause in the way it has delegated administrative authority
to implement other statutory provisions like, for example, Section 111
of the Copyright Act. Second, courts cannot abdicate their positive
responsibility of adjudicating disputes brought before them. At a
minimum, they must resolve whether a case is justiciable in the first
place. They must decide, for example, whether there is a ripe controversy worthy of their attention or whether they have jurisdiction to
hear the matter. They cannot defer those questions to any other institution.
More generally, courts routinely decide how to interpret contested terms without consulting other institutions. They decide which resources or kinds of authorities are worth considering and following.
Courts decide, for example, whether and to what extent legislative
history or other evidence of congressional intent matters when determining the scope of a substantive right or obligation.282 They do
this as a matter of interpretive judicial philosophy ex ante283 or because, pursuant to the statutory provision at issue, they must consider
certain legislative factors in their analysis.284 Or they decide that they
should review certain agency actions in a certain way.285 That is, pursuant to their native duty to say what the law is, they devise standards
of judicial review and deference to account for constitutional or institutional considerations unmentioned in the legislation at issue.286
We might assume that it is with this background in mind that the
courts in the cases involving Aereo and FilmOn appeared to have taken it as an article of faith that they could and should decide what
Congress meant by including the term “publicly” in the definition of
282. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266 (2011) (“Those of us who make
use of legislative history . . . .”).
283. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, SCALIA & GARNER’S READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
284. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1951) (discussing standards under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2012)).
285. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
980 (2005); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Universal Camera,
340 U.S. at 487.
286. See generally GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 927 (Strauss et. al eds.,
2011) (discussing Clarke Byse, Scope of Judicial Review in Informal Rulemaking, 33 ADMIN. L.
REV. 183, 193 (1981) and Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives in Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780–81 (1975)).
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performance in the Transmit Clause. But the decision about how to
interpret contested terms is not as obvious or unimportant as the
Aereo opinions’ silence on the matter suggests. In cases involving disruptive networked communications technologies generally, courts
routinely convey humility, or at least self-awareness, about the limits of
their institutional authority or capacity.
Courts have done this recently in cases involving issues as disparate as electronic communication surveillance by law enforcement officials on the one hand, and broadband network management practices of internet service providers on the other. As to electronic
surveillance, courts have not hesitated to say in the first instance what
the Fourth Amendment allows.287 Yet, even in this area, the Supreme
Court has wrung its hands demonstrably about whether it or Congress
is better suited to defining the scope of privacy protection in cases involving technologically novel surveillance techniques.288 They do this
notwithstanding their uncontroverted exclusive authority to interpret
constitutional provisions.289 They even have invited Congress to provide guidance on how to define privacy in recent cases involving surveillance techniques that rely on novel networked communications
technologies like location tracking.290 And, yet, at the same time,
courts have recognized that they are at the peak of their institutional
authority when they are asked to resolve disputes about the substantive scope of a constitutional right. Outside of a narrow range of statutes through which Congress has delegated policymaking authority to
federal law enforcement officials to define the contours of statutory
privacy rights,291 agencies do not have an articulated responsibility to
define the scope of protection from electronic surveillance under the
Fourth Amendment.292
287. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001).
288. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).
289. See Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total
Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 512–14 (2014).
290. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[C]oncern about new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these intrusions.”). Justice Alito flatly observed in his concurring opinion in Jones that, “in circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may
be legislative.” Id. at 964.
291. See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
292. Of course, this is not to say that agencies do not have some rulemaking authority
on privacy law outside of law enforcement surveillance. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Patient
Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005).
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The governance of local internet service providers, on the other
hand, is very different from the governance of law enforcement surveillance techniques. Importantly, local broadband network management is not a constitutional matter. As technologies change, the
FCC implements the objectives set out in the Communications Act
through a wide range of regulatory activities.293 Nevertheless, the federal courts have not hesitated to define or reflect on the obligations of
internet service providers under the Communications Act.294 They
have done so, however, within the bounds of transsubstantive deference doctrines and administrative law doctrine generally.295 Courts
have decided that the agencies to which Congress has delegated authority are best situated to interpret the pertinent statutory terms.
As to both areas, electronic surveillance and broadband network
management, courts are always explicitly mindful of the limits of their
relative institutional authority and capacity. Scholars of these two areas in particular, too, have attended to the courts’ relative institutional role.296
C. Towards a Theory of Implied Delegation in Video Distribution Law
1. Deference in Action
Should we treat the Transmit Clause as a provision that courts
have the exclusive responsibility of elaborating in the first instance
(like the Fourth Amendment)?297 Or is it more like a provision in a
regulatory regime that a federal agency has the delegated authority to
administer (like that set out in the Communications Act)? Or does it
fit somewhere in between?
293. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 157, 1302(a) (2012); see also id. § 201(b) (authorizing
the agency to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out” provisions of the statute).
294. See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Comcast Corp. v. FCC,
600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
295. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–84,
991 (2005) (applying Chevron to agency interpretation of definitional terms in Communications Act); cf. City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870–72 (2013) (applying
Chevron to agency interpretation of jurisdictional provision).
296. See generally Kerr, supra note 9; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1958 (2013); Sylvain, supra note 151, at 795; Olivier Sylvain, Internet
Governance and Democratic Legitimacy, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 205, 259–61 (2010).
297. To be sure, the Copyright Clause in the Constitution does not engage courts in
the way the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does. The latter enlists courts to
measure executive overreach. The former, on the other hand, explicitly authorizes Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by setting “limits” on creators’
exclusive rights to their copyrighted works. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. But that structural
difference went unnoticed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Aereo.
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Chevron does not really answer those questions, but another canonical Supreme Court case in modern administrative law doctrine
provides important guidance. In United States v. Mead,298 the Supreme
Court identified the various considerations that judges must generally
take into account when deciding whether to defer or what level of
deference courts should give to agencies.299 The Mead Court held that
courts must inquire into how and whether Congress intended to delegate to the Customs Office the authority to implement the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States before scrutinizing the validity of the agency’s action.300 If a court finds no such intention, then
it will be less deferential than required under Chevron.301 Courts only
have to consider “the thoroughness” of the agency’s analysis, “the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.”302
After Mead, one of the key questions for federal courts is whether
Congress has one way or another delegated to the agency at issue the
authority to interpret and administer an ambiguous provision with
the “force of law.”303 Deference—whether obedience or simply
weighty consideration—will depend on whether the agency’s interpretation is “made in pursuance of official duty” and premised on
“more specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case.”304
This inquiry, sometimes called Chevron Step Zero,305 must come
before the reviewing court analyzes the substantive merits of the
agency action at issue. The Court in Mead explained that an agency
can manifest its expertise in a “great variety of ways.”306 Depending on
what the governing statute allows, an agency may manifest congressional intent by rulemaking, adjudication, enforcement, or any other
number of methods.307 Courts, meanwhile, must be prepared to honor “the spectrum of possible agency action” that Congress has permit-

298.
299.
300.
301.
(2000).
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Id. at 227–34.
Id. at 226–28; see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983 (discussing Mead).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–28; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87
Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
Id. at 226–27, 229.
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 193 (2006).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 235–36.
Id. at 236.
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ted.308 Deference, the Court explained, must be “tailor[ed]” to the
variety of forms that agency action may take.309 Otherwise, courts
would be unresponsive to the range of regulatory strategies that Congress pursues to further complex legislative purposes.310 Mead in this
regard encourages agencies to be flexible in undertaking their delegated authority and, just as importantly, requires courts to consider
the “variety of ways” in which Congress may have implicitly delegated
to an agency the power to implement the statute at issue.311 This rule
does not compromise judicial authority to scrutinize agency action, as
much as impose on courts the sensible duty of being self-aware of the
limits of their interpretive authority.312 The doctrine has courts
choose between obeying the agency interpretation at issue, treating
the agency view on the matter as a “constituent element[] of its own
decision, as persuasive if not controlling,” or “as simply irrelevant.”313
2. An Alternative to Indifference in Aereo
The various courts that heard the recent disputes involving Aereo
and FilmOn did not consider the question of whether they ought to
consult legal analysis of online video distribution by the Copyright Office or the FCC.314 In their silence, the courts seemed to presume that
they alone have the authority or capacity to define the scope of protection under the Transmit Clause.
As a formal matter, they are not necessarily wrong. Congress did
not explicitly delegate the authority to interpret the Transmit Clause
to any institution and, under current doctrine, federal courts are not
obliged to apply Chevron deference to an agency interpretation unless
Congress manifests an intention to authorize that agency “to be able
to speak with the force of law.”315 Neither the Copyright Office nor
the FCC have an explicit obligation under the Copyright Act to fill
gaps in the Transmit Clause or promulgate binding legal rules that
interpret the public performance right. It is likely for this reason that
courts did not convey any doubt that they could ignore statements by
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993).
311. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003–05
(2005) (Breyer, J. concurring) (discussing Mead).
312. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 234
(quoting Skidmore).
313. Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect
for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 822–23 (2001).
314. See supra Part I.D.
315. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
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the Copyright Office or the FCC on how to treat online video distribution.316 For the courts, those agencies are to be ignored until a litigant challenges their interpretations in court.
But existing doctrine, especially after Mead, does not require that
courts be inattentive to agency interpretations of public law in fields
about which Congress has assumed that they are expert.317 While
there is no explicit delegation of authority to interpret the Transmit
Clause, one can infer from the Copyright Act that the Copyright Office has the authority to make sense of that provision when new technologies emerge. This seems especially sensible in the video distribution context, where the Copyright Office and the FCC have been, and
must be, very active.
As I explained above, pursuant to legislative command,318 the
Copyright Office and FCC have issued reports and administered proceedings on how disruptive emergent online video streaming applications are and whether they square with the terms of current law.319 To
be sure, these agencies have not had the occasion (never mind the
explicit authority) to say anything about how or whether unauthorized online video streaming of broadcast programming infringes
broadcasters’ public performance right under the Transmit Clause.
But the Copyright Office and the FCC have committed substantial resources and expertise to the general question on which the Aereo majority rested its holding: whether online streaming is like cable television service. Before the Court decided Aereo, both agencies decided
that online video distribution is not sufficiently like cable to warrant
protection under at least two other related provisions under the Copyright Act and the Communications Act.320
It is peculiar that existing doctrine could allow courts to ignore
the substantial efforts that the Copyright Office and the FCC have expended on the point. At a minimum, nothing in Mead or administra-

316. The matter would have been different if the litigants had argued or briefed the
point.
317. Cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27, 229 (“It can be apparent from the agency’s generally
conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when addressing ambiguity in the statute
or fills in a space in the enacted law, even one about which Congress did not have intent as
to a particular result. When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing
court must accept the agency’s position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point
at issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.”); see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
318. See supra Part II.
319. See supra Part III.A.
320. See supra Part II.B.
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tive law doctrine generally forbids courts from entertaining their conclusions.
One might even assume that current administrative law doctrine
empowers courts to consider agency interpretations of related provisions in the legislative field. There are at least two reasons for this.
First, courts defer to agency interpretations even when they are not a
party to the litigation before them. This is true across different substantive areas, including matters related to the Aereo and FilmOn
video distribution applications. Consider again the ivi case.321 In ivi,
in a dispute concerning the scope of coverage of the compulsory licensing provision, the Second Circuit deferred to the Copyright Office’s repeated determination that online video applications are not
like cable and, therefore, not entitled to a compulsory license to retransmit broadcast programming.322 The panel reached this conclusion even though the Copyright Office was not a party to the litigation. The agency’s delegated authority and expertise in the legislative
field were enough to warrant deference.323
Second, in Mead, the Court sought to accommodate the variety of
ways in which Congress grants authority to agencies.324 Sometimes
Congress delegates to agencies the responsibility of promulgating
rules that carry the force of law. Courts will give such agency actions
Chevron deference. Sometimes, however, Congress allows agencies to
make “interpretive choices” that do not bind judges.325 Even in these
cases, courts defer, conveying something between “near indifference”
to simple respect to “substantial deference.”326 In any event, the specific features of the agency action shape the “fair measure of deference” that courts choose to give.327 The question in any such case is

321. See supra notes 192–199 and accompanying text; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
322. WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 283–84 (2d Cir. 2012).
323. Id. Or consider a decision from just this past term in which the Court, in determining the reach of a provision in the Federal Labor Standards Act, gave considerable
consideration to the Department of Labor’s approach to “similar” concerns even though it
was not a party to the litigation. Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 517–18
(2014); id. at 520 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S.
576, 587 (2000)).
324. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).
325. Id. at 227.
326. Id. at 228 (quoting Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467
U.S. 380, 389–90 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
327. Id. Courts look “to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and
relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of [its] position.” Id. (footnotes omitted)
(citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944)).
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whether the agency’s interpretations bear any of the hallmarks of authority and expertise worthy of consideration.
I accordingly propose here a framework for judicial interpretation of a statutory provision that is separate but intertwined with a
general regulatory regime in which Congress has delegated administrative or lawmaking responsibilities to an agency. The occasion for
this kind of judicial review would be, as in Aereo, a dispute between
private parties about the applicability of an ambiguous provision to a
novel technology otherwise regulated by the agency. The agency’s interpretation would be entitled to consideration to the extent it has authority to interpret a significantly related statutory provision.328
Under the approach I propose here, the judicial inquiry about
how far the public performance right reaches would not begin and
end with an analysis of the Transmit Clause or related provisions in
the Copyright Act. Courts also would as a matter of course consider
whether the Copyright Office or the FCC has determined whether a
new video distribution technology is too unfamiliar (too disruptive) to
fall within the ambit of the compulsory licensing, must-carry, retransmission consent, or program access laws—or, in the terms on which
the Aereo court relied, whether those agencies have decided whether
video streaming is like cable or not.
Attending to all of the public law of video distribution—
legislation and agency action in the field—would best effectuate congressional intent. After all, the governing statutes reflect Congress’
decision that the balance of the diverse interests in the market for
video programming distribution ought to be resolved in the first instance by the Copyright Office and the FCC. Legislators concluded
that those agencies are best situated to assess the efficacy of current
law in light of new innovations. They charged those agencies with the
responsibility of keeping abreast of changes in the market, reporting
those findings to Congress, and promulgating binding regulations
when necessary to effectuate legislative intent. These are the very
kinds of regulatory interventions to which the Court has pointed to
justify routine judicial deference to agencies.329
Courts of general jurisdiction do not have the same claim to expertise or institutional authority under these circumstances.330 Nor
328. See supra Part III.B.
329. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
330. Compare courts of general jurisdiction to the various specialized courts, including
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Tax Court. See also Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (disavowing portion of majority’s opinion in patent case that addressed the “fine de-
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can courts administer the careful policy balance embodied in video
distribution law in the way that those agencies do on a case-by-case basis. Of course, courts have an important role to play. If neither Congress nor the pertinent agencies have determined (or can agree on)
how or whether any provision applies to a particular dispute, they
should employ the full sweep of interpretive tools to make sense of
the law at issue as they normally would—that is, as the majority and
dissent did in Aereo. Courts in these cases would do so based on the
assumption that they are the first to address the question generally or
that, in their protracted silence, Congress and the agencies expect as
much from the courts.331 In this regard, my proposal does nothing to
diminish public law interpretation by courts.
But when the Copyright Office or the FCC has determined that a
new technology is too disruptive to justify applying a related provision
in the Copyright Act or the Communications Act,332 as they have here,
courts ought to defer to or at least consider that prior agency interpretation, apart from whether it would produce a different result. In
this regard, my proposal would inject a degree of humility and discipline to the interpretive endeavor that to this point has been sorely
missing in this legislative field.333 More generally, it would be a corrective to the sense of interpretive exceptionalism in judicial interpretation.
As it relates to judicial review of disputes concerning the application of the public performance right to online video streaming, my
proposal would require courts to make several inquiries. Courts
should take into account whether the Copyright Office or the FCC
has considered whether the emergent technology is covered by compulsory licensing, retransmission consent, must-carry, or program access laws before proceeding to an analysis of the scope of broadcasters’ public performance rights. If neither agency has spoken on the
matter, I propose that courts engage in a de novo analysis of the applicability of the public performance right as they would a provision

tails of molecular biology” because he could not “affirm those details” on the basis of his
personal knowledge or belief).
331. Then again, it is unlikely that sudden technological disruptions and shifts in the
market like the one the United States is experiencing today for video distribution will remain unaddressed by Congress or agencies. Congress is considering at least two bills that
would be addressed directly to online video streaming. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 283–84 (2d Cir. 2012)(considering,
and then giving deference to, the Copyright Office’s interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)’s
compulsory licensing scheme).
333. See supra Part I.D.
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that no single agency has the responsibility of administering or implementing. If, however, the Copyright Office or the FCC has indeed
determined one way or another how or whether a corollary provision
applies to the new technology at issue, I would require courts to defer
to that agency’s interpretation as a matter of course.334
IV. CONCLUSION
Online video streaming applications have turned the traditional
broadcast model inside out. Users today control what and how they
watch video programming. These services are so different today from
what existed just a generation ago that, until a divided Supreme Court
decided the matter last term, courts did not agree on how such services square with existing law. Courts were uncertain, for example,
about whether the new technologies are sufficiently novel not to be
covered under the public performance right, a provision that Congress included in the 1976 Copyright Act specifically to address the
unique political economy of cable retransmission of broadcast programming.
Today, at a time when so much in the market for internet-based
applications and services is contested, I argue here that courts should
be far more careful in their application of the public performance
right to disruptive technologies like online video streaming than they
have been. Instead, they should defer to the agencies to which Congress has delegated the authority to interpret interacting provisions
under the Copyright Act—that is, to all of the public law that Congress has set in motion. Courts, of course, should continue to be at
their most searching when they are asked to interpret a provision that
they have the authority to define in the first instance. But they also
should be far more careful when they are asked to make sense of a
provision in a complex legislative field for which Congress has given
to agencies the primary responsibility of updating and implementing
during dramatic times of change.

334. This deference could not be any greater than what is required under Chevron, but
I do not offer here any firm proposal on the level of deference to which agencies would be
entitled under these circumstances. I leave this question to a future project.
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